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Abstract. We survey the literature on the privacy of trajectory micro-data, i.e., spatiotemporal in-
formation about the mobility of individuals, whose collection is becoming increasingly simple and
frequent thanks to emerging information and communication technologies. The focus of our review
is on privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP), i.e., the publication of databases of trajectory micro-
data that preserve the privacy of the monitored individuals. We classify and present the literature of
attacks against trajectory micro-data, as well as solutions proposed to date for protecting databases
from such attacks. This paper serves as an introductory reading on a critical subject in an era of
growing awareness about privacy risks connected to digital services, and provides insights into open
problems and future directions for research.
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1 Introduction
Our lives are increasingly entangled with ubiquitous communication technologies. Calling
someone on a mobile phone, tweeting about an event, browsing the World Wide Web, using
a car navigation system, or paying with a credit card are a few examples of situations that
create a seamless trail of digital breadcrumbs about our daily activities. These actions are
easily recorded and persistently stored into databases. Today, the pervasiveness of mobile
communication technologies allows tracking millions of users simultaneously, leading to
the collection of vast amounts of personal mobility data, which are then mined for many
and varied purposes, such as location-based marketing, targeted advertising, behavioural
profiling, transportation analysis, liability attribution, or security enforcement – just to cite
a few relevant applications.
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2Iden%fiers	 Spa%otemporal	points	[with	non-posi,oning	informa,on]	 A3ributes	
Alice	
+39	320	191	7047	
45.061679,	7.677888	
2018/01/24	08:05	
45.062518,	7.662191	
2018/01/24	10:32	
45.062288,	7.671960	
2018/01/24	14:18	
45.058935,	7.686642	
2018/01/24	19:41	
45.070908,	7.684926	
2018/01/24	22:01	
Female	 Accountant	 €	36,000	
Bob	
+39	339	205	3011	
45.068962,	7.698691	
2018/01/24	07:10	
45.068962,	7.698691	
2018/01/24	07:13	
45.067780,	7.694743	
2018/01/24	09:20	
45.079630,	7.671697	
2018/01/24	16:18	
45.081024,	7.625563	
2018/01/24	16:53	
Male	 Engineer	 €	74,000	
Charlie	
+39	347	772	3345	
45.068962,	7.698691	
2018/01/24	07:10	
45.068962,	7.698691	
2018/01/24	07:13	
45.033696,	7.675753	
2018/01/24	11:53	
45.040004,	7.676439	
2018/01/24	11:54	
45.081024,	7.625563	
2018/01/24	16:53	
Male	 Lawyer	 €	74,000	
Dave	
+39	328	055	4606	
45.094756,	7.526836	
2018/01/24	12:26	
45.090878,	7.528896	
2018/01/24	13:13	
45.066634,	7.515850	
2018/01/24	15:17	
45.063240,	7.522717	
2018/01/24	17:48	
45.092090,	7.524776	
2018/01/24	19:33	
Female	 Consultant	 €	103,000	
Erin	
+39	348	223	1098	
45.135216,	7.760983	
2018/01/24	07:11	
[incoming	SMS]	
45.008652,	7.532330	
2018/01/25	03:44	
[outgoing	call]	
45.109635,	7.640991	
2018/01/24	20:32	
[loca,on	area	update]	
45.109635,	7.640991	
2018/01/24	20:58	
[outgoing	SMS]	
45.105176,	7.641850	
2018/01/24	21:48	
[outgoing	call]	
Male	 Plumber	 €	31,000	
Frank	
+39	333	879	4903	
45.064937,	7.641850	
2018/01/24	23:29	
[outgoing	call]	
45.008652,	7.532330	
2018/01/25	03:44	
[incoming	SMS]	
45.008652,	7.532330	
2018/01/24	22:48	
[outgoing	SMS]	
45.004768,	7.535076	
2018/01/24	23:35	
[incoming	SMS]	
45.003069,	7.532673	
2018/01/25	00:42	
[incoming	SMS]	
NA	 NA	 NA	
Figure 1: Example of database of trajectory micro-data. Each record is composed of an
identifier (left), a spatiotemporal trajectory (middle), and additional attributes (right). In
this specific example, the person’s name and phone address are the identifiers, and spa-
tiotemporal points in the trajectory are GPS locations augmented with non-positioning in-
formation, within brackets, about their mobile communication activity. Attributes consist
of gender, employment and revenue.
The galloping pace of innovations in this field, along with the increasing trend of digital-
ization of our lives, suggests that what we are experiencing nowadays is just the tip of the
iceberg. In fact, services based on personal data records promise to be life-changers for the
newer generations, with a clear trend of innovation happening in the data domain, where
social networks (and alike) collect and exploit users’ information more and more [116].
A common trait to most of these emerging technologies is that they often build and rely
on databases that compose of or include trajectory micro-data. As the term indicates, these
are micro-data, i.e., information about single individuals, that describe their spatiotemporal
trajectories, i.e., sequences of geographical positions of the monitored individuals over time.
Figure 1 shows a toy example of a typical trajectory micro-data database: each record cor-
responds to one person, and contains an identifier as well as a set of geo-referenced and
time-stamped elements, or spatiotemporal points. Depending on the nature of the database,
the elements can also include non-positioning (e.g., numerical or categorical) information
associated to each spatiotemporal point. Also, the database can present additional fields
that map to attributes beyond the spatiotemporal trajectory.
The definition of trajectory micro-data database above is generic enough to encompass
positioning information gathered in a variety of ways, via different platforms and tech-
nologies. For the sake of clarity, we illustrate below five prominent examples of trajectory
micro-data sources.
• Location-based services (LBS) are implemented as applications running on mobile
devices (e.g., smartphones or tablets), which upload user position data as required
for service operation. Many extremely popular applications, such as Google Maps,
FourSquare, Twitter, Instagram, or Pokemon Go fall in this category, and unrelently
capture trajectory micro-data of individuals.
• Cellular network operators deploy passive monitoring systems in their networks to
collect data about their subscribers’ activity, for purposes including billing, traffic
engineering or added-value service development. Such data include time-stamped
user locations (e.g., the location of the antenna which the user device is associated
to, or a triangulated point from signal strength indicators). For instance, research-
favoured call detail records (CDR) allow tracking mobile subscribers every time their
devices interact with the network.
• Mobile devices equipped with Wi-Fi interfaces typically broadcast probe messages
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3to discover nearby Access Points (APs). By letting APs (or sniffers, i.e., dedicated de-
vices that passively monitor probe messages) record the unique Medium Access Con-
trol (MAC) address of the devices emitting such probes, the Wi-Fi access provider can
track users within coverage of the Wi-Fi network. In presence of large deployments,
e.g., covering municipalities or urban transportation infrastructures, mobile devices
can be potentially followed across a vast portion of their movements.
• Modern car navigation systems have Internet connection capability, thanks to an em-
bedded mobile network interface. This setup allows notifying drivers about road
traffic conditions in real time, but also to collect fine-grained positioning data while
the vehicle engine is on. Such data are used by navigation system providers to deter-
mine the congestion level of roads, and by insurance companies to determine liability
in case of accidents or to profile driving styles and associated risk levels.
• Electronic payments are replacing cash in everyday’s shopping. The resulting trans-
actions are easily linked to the address of the retailer who accepted the payment,
which allows companies in the banking sector to monitor the movements of their
customers as they use their debit or credit cards.
In all examples above, new and pervasive technologies allow the collection of trajectory
micro-data at very large scales, i.e., enable tracking thousands to millions of users at once.
It is precisely the possibility of knowing the movement patterns of large populations at an
individual level that paves the road to a wide range of applications for databases of trajec-
tory micro-data. Such applications encompass a variety of contexts, including intelligent
transportation, assisted-life services, city planning, location-based marketing, data-driven
decision-making, or infrastructure optimization. As a result, network and service providers
are eager to exploit trajectory micro-data in new ways by continuously developing origi-
nal dedicated platforms [39, 3], and financial forecasts expect trajectory micro-data-driven
services to grow into a new multibillion-dollar market in the coming years [1, 46]. Ulti-
mately, the appearance of such a large and innovative ecosystem creates a whole new need
for gathering, storing, provisioning, circulating and trading databases of trajectory micro-
data.
1.1 Privacy of trajectory micro-data
Privacy is an obvious major concern at all stages of trajectory micro-data manipulation.
This consideration holds no matter whether the ultimate aim of the data processing is the
discovery of new knowledge or the monetization of embedded information. As a matter of
fact, owing to the nature of trajectory micro-data, incorrect stewardship can easily reveal
sensitive personal information about the users. Examples include iOS devices storing their
own spatiotemporal trajectories in unencrypted format and transmitting them to Apple [31,
30], US mobile carriers selling real-time personal trajectory micro-data to third party service
providers [103], or demand-side platforms for targeted advertising in mobile phone apps
paving the way to uncontrolled collection of personal trajectory micro-data [137]. This is
also generating a growing concern in the general public, as awareness is raising about the
privacy risks associated with spatiotemporal tracking [135], and about how such personal
information is shared in the data market [136].
Situations such as those mentioned above call for privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP)
of trajectory micro-data databases in all contexts where this kind of data is stored or shared.
PPDP recommends that databases should be transformed prior to publication in potentially
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4Pseudo-iden*fier	 Spa*otemporal	points	[with	non-posi,oning	informa,on]	 A5ributes	
2BD806C97F0E00! 45.061679,	7.677888	
2018/01/24	08:05	
45.062518,	7.662191	
2018/01/24	10:32	
45.062288,	7.671960	
2018/01/24	14:18	
45.058935,	7.686642	
2018/01/24	19:41	
45.070908,	7.684926	
2018/01/24	22:01	
Female	 Accountant	 €	36,000	
81B637D8FCD2C6 ! 45.068962,	7.698691	
2018/01/24	07:10	
45.068962,	7.698691	
2018/01/24	07:13	
45.067780,	7.694743	
2018/01/24	09:20	
45.079630,	7.671697	
2018/01/24	16:18	
45.081024,	7.625563	
2018/01/24	16:53	
Male	 Engineer	 €	74,000	
B9DD960C175345! 45.068962,	7.698691	
2018/01/24	07:10	
45.068962,	7.698691	
2018/01/24	07:13	
45.033696,	7.675753	
2018/01/24	11:53	
45.040004,	7.676439	
2018/01/24	11:54	
45.081024,	7.625563	
2018/01/24	16:53	
Male	 Lawyer	 €	74,000	
7CBCCB0C4CAADF ! 45.094756,	7.526836	
2018/01/24	12:26	
45.090878,	7.528896	
2018/01/24	13:13	
45.066634,	7.515850	
2018/01/24	15:17	
45.063240,	7.522717	
2018/01/24	17:48	
45.092090,	7.524776	
2018/01/24	19:33	
Female	 Consultant	 €	103,000	
61EA0803F88535! 45.135216,	7.760983	
2018/01/24	07:11	
[incoming	SMS]	
45.008652,	7.532330	
2018/01/25	03:44	
[outgoing	call]	
45.109635,	7.640991	
2018/01/24	20:32	
[loca,on	area	update]	
45.109635,	7.640991	
2018/01/24	20:58	
[outgoing	SMS]	
45.105176,	7.641850	
2018/01/24	21:48	
[outgoing	call]	
Male	 Plumber	 €	31,000	
77646F5A4F3166! 45.064937,	7.641850	
2018/01/24	23:29	
[outgoing	call]	
45.008652,	7.532330	
2018/01/25	03:44	
[incoming	SMS]	
45.008652,	7.532330	
2018/01/24	22:48	
[outgoing	SMS]	
45.004768,	7.535076	
2018/01/24	23:35	
[incoming	SMS]	
45.003069,	7.532673	
2018/01/25	00:42	
[incoming	SMS]	
NA	 NA	 NA	
Figure 2: Example of pseudonymisation of the database in Figure 1. Identifiers (left) are
replaced with values that cannot be linked with the person’s identity. The spatiotemporal
trajectory and additional attributes remain unchanged.
hostile environments, so as to grant that the published data remains useful while individual
privacy is preserved [55].
The common practice adopted by data collectors and data owners in order to protect
the privacy of the individuals they monitor is pseudonymisation, also referred to as de-
personification. This straightforward approach consists in removing all personal identifiers
(e.g., information that is directly linked to the person’s identity, such as name, telephone
number, precise address, plate number, etc.), and replacing them with some pseudorandom
identifier; the latter can be a keyed hash of the original personal identifiers, or simply a ran-
dom number that is uniquely associated to the trajectory micro-data of an actual individual.
Figure 2 provides an example of pseudonymisation, for the database in Figure 1.
Unfortunately, pseudonymisation only provides a very mild level of protection. A num-
ber of experiments, performed in recent times and using large-scale real-world datasets,
have repeatedly demonstrated the significant risks associated to pseudonymised trajectory
micro-data. In particular, naive cross-correlation of pseudonymised data with named side
information (obtained from, e.g., public-access social network data) leads to re-identification,
i.e., disclosure of the identities of users with high probability, making pseudonymisation
basically useless. We will discuss the detailed investigations leading to such conclusions
later on. What is relevant here is that, in the light of these findings and quite unsurpris-
ingly, data controllers have nowadays become extremely cautious in opening access to
pseudononymised trajectory micro-data. A prominent example is that of TfL, the transport
regulator in London, UK, which recently ran a pilot experiment by tracking passengers in
the London Underground network via Wi-Fi probes broadcasted by mobile devices. TfL
later rejected a Freedom of Information (FOI) request to release the pseudonymised dataset,
exactly because of the potential re-identification risks of the data [88].
With such a growth of concerns about risks associated with uncontrolled gathering and
mining of trajectory micro-data, regulatory bodies have been working on new legal frame-
works dedicated to personal data protection. A leading act in this sense is the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [51], which became effective on May 2018 and applies to all
European Union citizens. The GDPR enforces that data controllers shall adopt the best mea-
sures for data protection by design and by default. Such measures include pseudonymisa-
tion, as it can reduce the risks for the data subjects concerned and help controllers and pro-
cessors to meet their data-protection obligations. However, the GDPR makes it very clear
that pseudonymisation alone is an insufficient privacy measure when it comes to PPDP.
Indeed, the regulation decrees that pseudonymised data has still to be treated as personal
data, which must be securely stored and cannot be circulated freely. Instead, the GDPR lays
down that a more open publication of data is allowed upon anonymization, a process which
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5ensures that the data cannot be any longer linked to an identified or identifiable natural
person or data subject. According to the GDPR, anonymized data is not personal anymore,
hence is not concerned by the privacy-protection rules it defines.
Legislations such as the GDPR are thus an important part of the solution, as they make
procedures ensuring a correct data processing mandatory. However, they must be com-
plemented by sound technical solutions that implement the invoked “best measures” and
achieve the privacy goals set by PPDP. In the specific case of trajectory micro-data, devel-
oping anonymization algorithms that provably prevent any re-identification or personal
information inference from the original spatiotemporal points is extremely challenging. As
it is often the case in presence of difficult tasks, the problem has drawn a substantial effort
by the research community: a plethora of scientific papers have appeared over the past
decade, aiming both at unveiling privacy risks connected with trajectory micro-data, and
at proposing solutions to cope with such risks. However, such a large body of works tar-
gets heterogeneous types of trajectory micro-data, considers a variety of attacker models,
relies on different privacy criteria, and uses disparate data transformation techniques. This
substantial diversity makes the literature tangled and complicated to approach, raising
questions about where the current state of the art actually stands.
1.2 Objective, positioning and structure of the survey
This survey serves as a comprehensive introduction to the domain of privacy of trajectory
micro-data for PPDP. It summarizes almost two decades of research, providing a review of
a large number of works that cover all aspects of the problem. These include the assessment
of privacy risks in trajectory micro-data, the definition of attacks realizing such risks, and
the proposition of solutions that protect user privacy from the aforementioned attacks.
Our survey joins a rather small family of reviews that previously explored similar do-
mains. The early works by Decker [43] and Chow and Mokbel [36] overview privacy in
LBS: as we will explain in Section 1.3 below, this is an orthogonal problem with respect
to that of PPDP of trajectory micro-data. Garfinkel [59] provides a general overview of
personal information de-identification across a wide range of database types, including
geographic and map ones. The portion of the work dedicated to trajectory micro-data is
necessarily limited in such an holistic document, and does not cover the subject in depth.
Haris et al. [97] discuss privacy leakages, associated risks and potential remedies in the
broad context of mobile computing. Their review of the literature has a very wide breadth,
which is fully orthogonal to ours: indeed, the work targets applications and services rather
than data. Christin [37] focuses on mobile participatory sensing, discussing privacy threats
relevant to the different phases of the sensing process. Mobile participatory sensing can
generate in some cases trajectory micro-data, hence some reviewed works are also covered
in our document. However, the overlap is marginal, and the overall context, discussion of
challenges and conclusions by Christin [37] are related to data and processes of a different
nature from those of interest to us. The overlap is also minimal with the short review by
Al-Azizy et al. [8], who overview the literature on data de-anonymisation: on one hand,
they consider any class of data instead of the more specific trajectory micro-data; on the
other hand, they focus on de-anonymisation whereas we cover all aspects of the problem,
from risk assessment to solutions for data protection. Similar considerations hold for the
recent book edited by Gkoulalas-Divanis and Bettini [61], which provides a comprehen-
sive overview of current challenges and solutions in mobile data privacy; the book covers
a wide range of subjects, from data collection to management and analysis, but does not
include a dedicated discussion on mobile data PPDP. The work that is the closest in spirit
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6to ours is that by Bonchi et al. [21], who discuss a selected set of seven papers that pro-
pose techniques to anonymise trajectory micro-data: this is a small subset of the studies we
survey, which cover a much larger literature on both attack and protection techniques.
As a result, none of the existing surveys provides a literature overview that comprehen-
sively addresses trajectory micro-data privacy. This paper aims at closing this gap – a sign-
ficant one in the light of the rapid emergence of real-world services that heavily rely on
trajectory micro-data. The document is structured into two main Sections, respectively
dedicated to attacks against trajectory micro-data, and anonymisation of trajectory micro-
data. The former, in Section 2, reviews the body of works that assess the privacy risks as-
sociated with trajectory micro-data, by devising, implementing and evaluating attacks that
allow re-identifying users in a trajectory micro-data database. The latter, in Section 3, sur-
veys countermeasures proposed to protect trajectory micro-data from the aforementioned
privacy threats. The content of such Sections allows us to draw considerations, as well as
present open issues and research opportunities in Section 4.
1.3 Remarks
Before proceeding further, the following three important remarks are in order.
First, as anticipated above, our focus is on privacy-preserving publication (PPDP) of tra-
jectory micro-data, which is an entirely different problem than privacy in LBS. Indeed, the
two scenarios entail non-comparable system models. In the case of trajectory micro-data
publishing, databases of millions of records are mined offline, and the challenge is ensur-
ing that their circulation does not pose a threat to user privacy, but retains data utility. In
the case of LBS, single (geo-referenced and time-stamped) queries generated by mobile de-
vices must be processed in real-time, and the objective is location privacy, i.e., ensuring that
such a process preserves users’ privacy by preventing the service provider from locating
users. These considerations make PPDP of large-scale datasets the relevant problem in
the context of trajectory micro-data, while LBS are more concerned with the real-time ano-
nymization of small sets of spatiotemporal points; ultimately, this entails attacker models
and anonymization techniques that are very diverse for the two scenarios. Indeed, Xiao
and Xiong [139] and Bindschaedler et al. [18] have shown that individual spatiotemporal
points anonymized via solutions for location privacy are still vulnerable to attacks when
their time-ordered sequence is considered, i.e., when they are treated as a spatiotemporal
trajectory. As our focus is on trajectory releasing, the vast body of literature on privacy of
LBS is out of the scope of the present document; we refer readers with a specific interest
on privacy in LBS to the dedicated surveys by Decker [43], Chow and Mokbel [36], and
Bettini [14]. We remark, however, that there exist several privacy solutions proposed for
LBS that address location tracking over time, which is akin to protecting spatiotemporal
trajectories from linkage: both approaches aim at limiting the personal (and possibly sensi-
ble) information that the adversary can infer by accessing the target database of trajectory
micro-data. Although originally designed for online operation where only limited past mo-
bility information is available, such solutions can be also applied to offline contexts where
the complete trajectory is known. In this case, the aforementioned solutions effectively
work as techniques for PPDP of trajectory micro-data, and we thus include in our review
several works from the literature on LBS privacy that are also relevant to PPDP.
Second, consistently with the scope of the survey, we are interested in attacks and anony-
mization solutions that target trajectory micro-data. Therefore, we do not consider in our
review attacks against metadata that contain spatiotemporal information but where such
information is not factually exploited, as in the case of the mobile phone call graphs con-
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7sidered by Sharad and Danezis [118], or of the mobile subscriber communication history
studied by Mayer et al. [92]. Similarly, we target individual trajectories intended as se-
quences of spatiotemporal points, while we do not consider aggregate forms of such data,
like people counts or density. Hence, we do not review attacks against aggregate data from
trajectories, such as those designed, e.g., by Xu et al. [140], or privacy-preserving techniques
for aggregate statistics, such as those proposed, e.g., by Liu et al. [86]. And, we do not delve
in the details of anonymization techniques for the same type of data, such as those men-
tioned in Section 3.4.
Third, in the remainder of the document we will not make any distinction between orig-
inal and pseudonymised trajectory micro-data, and just refer to both as trajectory micro-
data. The rationale for this choice is that, as already anticipated, pseudonymisation does
not provide any significant additional layer of privacy protection. As a result, the vast ma-
jority of works in the literature employ pseudonymised data for their studies, and treat
them in the same way as raw data.
2 Attacks on trajectory micro-data
The first part of our survey is dedicated to the body of works on attacks against trajec-
tory micro-data. The objective of these studies is thus proposing techniques that allow
re-identification or inference of personal data from datasets of trajectory micro-data, im-
plicitly revealing privacy risks associated to the inconsiderate publication of this class of
databases. To structure our discussion, we present in Section 2.1 an original taxonomy of
attack strategies against trajectory micro-data found in the literature. Then, in Sections 2.2
to 2.8, we review relevant studies, separating them into several classes that are based on
the proposed taxonomy.
2.1 A taxonomy of attacks
Attack models are typically defined by a precise objective, and by the background knowl-
edge that the adversary can exploit towards attaining such an objective. The taxonomy
we adopt builds on three orthogonal dimensions that fully capture these features: (i) the
objective of the attack, discussed in Section 2.1.1; (ii) the format of the adversary’s knowl-
edge and (iii) its origin, which are both discussed in Section 2.1.2. The classification of the
literature that results from these three dimensions is finally presented in Section 2.1.3.
2.1.1 Attack objective
While the overall aim of an adversary remains that of re-identifying individuals in the tra-
jectory micro-data, or more generally acquiring sensitive information about them from the
trajectory micro-data, different approaches can be leveraged to those purposes. Each ap-
proach translates into a specialized attack objective (denoted as O in the rest of the paper),
which is the first dimension of our taxonomy. The attack objective is in fact a rather stan-
dard way to categorize privacy threats on generic micro-data datasets, and we borrow from
the classic codification by Fung et al. [55] to organize the literature along this dimension.
The vast majority of attacks against trajectory micro-data investigated in the literature be-
long to the category of record linkage attacks (O.1) as defined by Fung et al. [55], which
are often simply referred to as linkage attacks. As illustrated in the toy example in Figure 3,
record linkage attacks aim at mapping records in the target trajectory micro-data with side
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8Iden%fiers	 Spa%otemporal	points	
Alice	 45.062518,	7.662191	
2018/01/24	10:32	
45.048330,	7.696080	
2018/01/24	12:40	
45.062288,	7.671960	
2018/01/24	14:18	
45.061109,	7.677201	
2018/01/24	15:05	
45.061200,	7.677329	
2018/01/24	15:11	
Pseudo-iden%fier	 Spa%otemporal	points	[with	non-posi,oning	informa,on]	 A7ributes	
2BD806C97F0E00! 45.061679,	7.677888	
2018/01/24	08:05	
45.062518,	7.662191	
2018/01/24	10:32	
45.062288,	7.671960	
2018/01/24	14:18	
45.058935,	7.686642	
2018/01/24	19:41	
45.070908,	7.684926	
2018/01/24	22:01	
Female	 Accountant	 €	36,000	
81B637D8FCD2C6 ! 45.068962,	7.698691	
2018/01/24	07:10	
45.068962,	7.698691	
2018/01/24	07:13	
45.067780,	7.694743	
2018/01/24	09:20	
45.079630,	7.671697	
2018/01/24	16:18	
45.081024,	7.625563	
2018/01/24	16:53	
Male	 Engineer	 €	74,000	
B9DD960C175345! 45.068962,	7.698691	
2018/01/24	07:10	
45.068962,	7.698691	
2018/01/24	07:13	
45.033696,	7.675753	
2018/01/24	11:53	
45.040004,	7.676439	
2018/01/24	11:54	
45.081024,	7.625563	
2018/01/24	16:53	
Male	 Lawyer	 €	74,000	
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Figure 3: Examples of record linkage attacks against the pseudonymised database in Fig-
ure 2. Side information (top and bottom) contains personal identifiers (the identities of
Alice and Frank, respectively) and some spatiotemporal points. Record linkage exploits
matches in the trajectory data (e.g., identical GPS locations in the side information and tar-
get database, in red) to associate the identifiers to one record. It links the person to sensitive
data (in blue), be those attributes (e.g., Alice’s salary), or information embedded in the spa-
tiotemporal data itself (e.g., Frank visiting a gentlemen club at 45.064937, 7.641850).
information owned by the adversary. The side information must include personal iden-
tifiers, without which re-identification is not possible, as well as some (possibly limited)
data about the mobility of (a subset of) users in the target database. These can be collected
in a variety of ways: examples include directly observing target individuals (e.g., by phys-
ically meeting or following them and recording their movements), mining suitable open
data (e.g., via crawling of geo-referenced social network metadata), or gaining access to
samples of the actual trajectory micro-data (e.g., by leveraging a security breach).
A successful attack allows associating an identity to records in the target database. Es-
tablishing such a link represents a privacy breach when the records of the target database
contain sensitive attributes. In the context of trajectory micro-data, there are two different
situations where this happens, both exemplified in Figure 3.
• The typical assumption made in most of the works we will review is that the database
of trajectory micro-data also includes additional, separated sensitive attributes. For
instance, each record could include the spatiotemporal points as well as personal
data about the individual such as gender, age, address, employment, or accounting
information. In this case, mobility data allows linking personal identities with the
non-positioning sensitive data, as in Alice’s case in Figure 3.
• A second, subtler perspective is that trajectory micro-data embed information that is
potentially sensitive per-se. Gaining access to a large amount of timestamped loca-
tions visited by an individual may allow an adversary understand where the individ-
ual lives, where she works, and which kind of Points of Interest (PoIs) she visits. The
latter can reveal commuting patterns (e.g., regular presence at public transport sta-
tions), religious and political views (e.g., regular visits to places of worship or party
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Figure 4: Example of attribute linkage attacks against the pseudonymised database in Fig-
ure 2. Side information does not allow linking personal identifiers to one specific record,
since two different records contain the single matching spatiotemporal sample. However,
the two records yield the same revenue value, hence the attacker can still link the identity
of Charlie to the sensitive information of 74, 000 euro yearly income.
meetings), or personal or relatives’ health issues (e.g., frequent visits to hospital), just
to mention a few relevant examples. Extracting Points of Interest from trajectory
micro-data is in fact fairly easy. The vast literature on analysis of spatiotempral tra-
jectories proposes a variety of techniques to infer home, work, and other relevant
locations from this kind of data [100]. This would be the case of the record linkage
against Frank’s trajectory micro-data in Figure 3.
Classes of attack beyond record linkage have been rarely investigated in works related to
trajectory micro-data. Notable exceptions explored two additional attack categories.
The first is that of attribute linkage attacks (O.2) in the terminology by Fung et al. [55],
which are also known as homogeneity attacks. In this case, the objective of the adversary is to
link its side information with sensitive attributes (rather than specific records) in the target
trajectory micro-data. The typical scenario envisioned for attribute linkage is one were the
attacker’s side information maps to multiple records (hence preventing record linkage),
but all such records share the same sensitive attributes (which are thus re-indentified by
attribute linkage). Figure 4 depicts a toy example of database configuration that is prone
to a homogeneity attack on trajectory micro-data. Clearly, homogeneity attacks can be
successful in cases where record attacks are not possible, and thus pose a greater risk to
privacy. However, the privacy risks associated with a successful attribute linkage attack
are the same as for record linkage: indeed, the privacy breaches identified in the case of
record linkage occur because the adversary can re-identify the sensitive information within
a record, and not the specific record itself.
The other category of threats considered in the literature is that named probabilistic at-
tacks (O.3) by Fung et al. [55], which are also referred to as inference attacks in the literature.
The goal of a probabilistic attack is increasing the adversary’s knowledge by accessing the
target database. This is equivalent to generalizing the notion of sensitive attribute to any
information contained in a record: in the context of trajectory micro-data, learning any
additional, non-negligible portion of the mobility of a user beyond the original side infor-
mation already makes the attack successful. Figure 5 shows an example of probabilistic
attack on trajectory micro-data. Preventing probabilistic attacks is more challenging than
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Figure 5: Example of probabilistic attacks against the pseudonymised database in Figure 2.
Side information allows the adversary to increase his knowledge, by discovering two new
spatiotemporal samples, as well as the gender and revenue of the target individual, Char-
lie. All such additional information is considered as sensitive information in probabilistic
attacks.
countering record or attribute linkage, since the adversary’s goal is much broader.
2.1.2 Format and origin of the side information
To achieve any of the attack objectives above, an adversary must leverage some background
knowledge. This side information can have different formats, which drive the implemen-
tation of the attack. Thus, the second and third dimensions considered in our taxonomy
relate to the nature of the background data available to the adversary. Specifically, we tell
apart the two distinguishing characteristics of the side information: (i) its format, i.e., the
actual content of the side information; and (ii) its source, i.e., how the side information is
gathered.
Concerning the format of side information (F), we identify three classes from studies on
trajectory micro-data privacy.
In the baseline case, the side information has the exact same format of the mobility data
contained in the target database, i.e., a sequence of spatiotemporal points (F.1). There is
however a major distinction between two situations that can occur under this format.
• In a simpler case, the spatiotemporal points in the side information are a subset (F.1a)
of those contained in records of the target trajectory micro-data. This is the situation
portrayed in the previous examples in Figures 3–5. It assumes that the adversary
gathers side information using the exact same tracking technology employed to build
the target database, which can be seen as a best-case scenario for the attacker.
• In many practical scenarios, the adversary does not possess a perfect subset of the
trajectory micro-data. Instead, the spatiotemporal points in the side information are
obtained from a different source than that generating the trajectory micro-data, hence
they represent a diverse sampling (F.1b) of the underlying spatiotemporal trajectories
of the users. Figure 6 exemplifies this setting.
A second type of side information format is represented by indirect knowledge inferred
from trajectory micro-data. The adversary does not have access to precise spatiotemporal
points of his victim’s trajectory micro-data, but knows instead some high-level profiles (F.2)
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Figure 6: Example of record linkage attack against the pseudonymised database in Figure 2.
The side information includes a set of spatiotemporal points that does not perfectly match
any of those in the database. The adversary can still map his knowledge to the most similar
trajectory: multiple points in his possession are very close to those in one specific record,
which allows linking Dave’s identity to the sensitive revenue attribute.
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Figure 7: Example of record linkage attack against the pseudonymised database in Figure 2.
The side information includes a set of spatiotemporal points that does not perfectly match
any of those in the database. The adversary can build a profile of his victim (e.g., a proba-
bilistic mobility model of transitions among locations) from his knowledge, and match this
to similar profiles of all records in the database. A very similar profile is identified in the
second record, allowing linking Bob’s identity to the sensitive revenue attribute.
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2018/01/25	03:44	
[incoming	SMS]	
45.008652,	7.532330	
2018/01/24	22:48	
[outgoing	SMS]	
45.004768,	7.535076	
2018/01/24	23:35	
[incoming	SMS]	
45.003069,	7.532673	
2018/01/25	00:42	
[incoming	SMS]	
NA	 NA	 NA	
linked	side	informa%on	 sensi%ve	a7ribute	
Figure 8: Example of record linkage attack against the pseudonymised database in Fig-
ure 2. The side information includes a set of spatiotemporal points, each associated with
auxiliary data, within brackets, on mobile communication activities. While the positioning
data alone matches two records with different sensitive attributes, the additional knowl-
edge provided by the auxiliary data allows the adversary to tell apart the records, and link
Erin’s identity to the sensitive revenue attribute.
that characterize the movements of the target individuals. The notion of profile is general
and can accommodate a wide range of scenarios, among which we identify the following
four prominent situations:
• mobility models (F.2a) are mathematical representations that summarize the com-
plete movement behavior of the target individuals, as illustrated by Figure 7;
• important locations (F.2b) are places frequently visited by or very significant for the
target individuals;
• mobility features (F.2c) are specific properties found in the movement patterns of the
target individuals;
• social graphs (F.2d) are structures that describe the social relationships of the target
individuals with other users whose trajectories are also present in the database.
The third format of side information is a combination of trajectory micro-data and some
auxiliary data (F.3) that is not related to the mobility of the target individuals. We can
see this format as an augmented version of the two above, thanks to the addition of the
auxiliary data. Under the assumption that records on the target database also contain fields
related to the auxiliary data, such reinforced side information grants adversaries with an
additional degree of freedom to carry out their attacks. An intuitive example is provided
in Figure 8.
The last dimension we consider in our taxonomy of attacks on trajectory micro-data is
that of the source of side information (S) owned by the adversary. These sources can be
categorizes into two classes, as follows.
• The vast majority of works in the literature directly extract the side information from
the target trajectory micro-data. We refer to this approach as intra-record (S.1), since
the source of the side information is the data contained in the database records them-
selves. There exist two subcategories of intra-record sources. So-called intra-record
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subsampling (S.1a) leaves the original trajectory micro-data unmodified once the side
information is extracted: therefore, the side information is necessarily present in the
target database. Instead, intra-record training (S.1b) removes from the target trajec-
tory micro-data the side information, separating the original database into training
(used as the side information) and test (regarded as the actual target trajectory micro-
data) portions.
• A more realistic approach, which we name cross-database (S.2), consists in consid-
ering a side information source that is different from the target trajectory micro-data:
indeed, in practical cases, an adversary would derive his background knowledge
from direct observations of his victims’ movements, or from external datasets that
are fully disjoint from the target one. However, a cross-database approach requires
suitable side-information databases that contain mobility data for (a subset of) the
users in the target trajectory micro-data, and that are collected via a different technol-
ogy. Acquiring such databases can be complicated, which is why a small number of
works in the literature adopted this strategy.
2.1.3 Literature classification
We can now classify the existing works in the literature based on the three-dimensional tax-
onomy proposed in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 above. Table 1 summarizes how attacks against
trajectory micro-data proposed to date are positioned according to our taxonomy.
A first important observation is that, as anticipated, record linkage attacks (O.1) have
been thoroughly investigated, whereas very little attention has been paid to other types of
attacks (O.2, O.3). This also results in that a variety of formats of the side information have
been considered in the case of record linkage; instead, attribute linkage and probabilistic
attacks have been only evaluated with the most basic format, i.e., spatiotemporal subsets
(F.1a) of the trajectory micro-data.
The intersections of attacker objective and side information format (on rows) with the
side information source (on columns) also deserve attention. An important remark is that a
single type of source can generate multiple formats of the side information. For instance, let
us look at the case of intra-record subsampling (S.1a): it results in a spatiotemporal subset
format (F.1a), if the points extracted from the target trajectory micro-data are used as they
are by the adversary; it can be cast to a spatiotemporal diverse sampling format (F.1b) if
the extracted points are perturbed in time and space; or, it can lead to any profile formats
(F.2) if the extracted points are postprocessed to infer, e.g., important locations or specific
mobility features. Conversely, intra-record training (S.1a) and cross-database (S.2) sources
feature inherently diverse samplings with respect to the target data, hence cannot generate
a spatiotemporal subset format (F.1a), and the corresponding table cells are grayed out.
However, these sources can still result in all other side information formats.
Some patterns are more frequent than others. As an example, side information in the
format of a mobility model (F.2a) typically require that the model is trained and tested on
different datasets, making an intra-record training (S.1b) the most appropriate source. Or,
important locations (F.2b) are by far the most popular type of profile considered in attacks
against trajectory micro-data, have been tested with all sources of side information. Also,
there are substantial gaps in the literature when it comes to practical attacks that leverage a
cross-database source (S.2) and exploit profiles in the form of either mobility models (F.2a)
or features (F.2c).
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Table 1: Classification of the literature of attacks on trajectory micro-data based on the
proposed taxonomy. The three dimensions of the taxonomy are highlighted in bold. The
leftmost column separates rows according to different classes of attacker objective (O) as
per Section 2.1.1. The subsequent two columns refine rows according to different categories
and subcategories of side information format (F) as per Section 2.1.1. The last three columns
distinguish types and subtypes of side information source (S) as per Section 2.1.1. Grayed-
out cells denote unfeasible combinations of format and source.
Side information source (S)
Intra-record
S.1
Cross-database
S.2
Side information
format (F)
Subsampling
S.1a
Training
S.1b
A
tt
ac
ke
r
ob
je
ct
iv
e
(O
)
Record linkage
O.1
Points
F.1
Subset
F.1a
Bettini et al. [16]
De Montjoye et al. [40]
Rossi et al. [112]
Sapiezynski et al. [115]
De Montjoye et al. [41]
Diverse
sampling
F.1b
Ma et al. [89]
Rossi et al. [112]
Rossi and Musolesi [111] Tockar [127]
Cecaj et al. [27, 28]
Kondor et al. [81]
Riederer et al. [110]
Wang et al. [138]
Profile
F.2
Mobility model
F.2a
De Mulder et al. [42]
Shokri et al. [119]
Gambs et al. [56]
Murakami et al. [98]
Important
locations
F.2b
Freudiger et al. [54]
Zang and Bolot [144]
Unnikrishnan and
Naini [133]
Naini et al. [101]
Rossi and Musolesi [111]
Krumm [83]
Goga [62]
Mobility features
F.2c
Rossi et al. [112]
Zan et al. [143]
Social graph
F.2d
Srivatsa and Hicks [122]
Ji et al. [76, 77]
Auxiliary
F.3
Zang and Bolot [144]
De Montjoye et al. [41]
Goga [62]
Attribute
linkage
O.2
Points
F.1
Subset
F.1a
Sui et al. [123]
Probabilistic
O.3
Points
F.1
Subset
F.1a
Gramaglia et al. [65]
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Figure 9: The unicity of trajectories with respect to the num-
ber of random spatiotemporal points known to the adver-
sary, denoted by Ip. The green bars represent the fraction of
unique trajectories, while the blue bars show the fraction of
cases where the random points identify one or two trajecto-
ries. Knowledge of four points pinpoints 95% of the trajecto-
ries. The results refer to a 1.5-million-record database. Figure
from De Montjoye et al. [40].
Overall, Table 1 offers an outlook on well-explored and less investigated attack surfaces
against trajectory micro-data. It also motivates us to opt for a structure of the following
Sections that follows the rows of the table, for the following reasons: first, it is along rows
that we find most of the diversity among works; second, the format of the background
knowledge is what really guides the design of the attack strategy, since a side information
source can be shaped into different formats.
2.2 Record linkage via subset of trajectory micro-data
Record linkage attacks are straightforward when the side information database stores a
subset of the same spatiotemporal points present in the trajectory micro-data, as in class
O.1/F.1a in Table 1. As shown in Figure 3, it is sufficient that the adversary looks for records
in the trajectory micro-data that include the points he owns.
The key question here is: how much such side information is required to perform a suc-
cessful linkage? The answer roots in the concept of unicity, which is a measure of the
diversity that characterizes the movement patterns of different individuals. The higher the
unicity of trajectory micro-data, the higher the actual privacy risk connected with them: if
the monitored users have very diverse spatiotemporal trajectories, an adversary will likely
find a single trajectory micro-data record matching the side information points he owns.
In a pioneering work, Bettini et al. [16] first hint at unicity in trajectory micro-data by
introducing the notion of a location-based quasi-identifier (LBQID). The formal definition1
of LBQID is “a spatio-temporal pattern specified by a sequence of spatio-temporal constraints each
one defining an area and a time span, and by a recurrence formula”. In other words, a LBQID is
a sequence of spatiotemporal areas (which could specialize to points at high granularity)
that define a mobility pattern, and some associated frequency of occurrence (which could
specialize to just one occurrence). The intuition of Bettini et al. [16] is that it is possible to
define LBQIDs that require a minimum amount of knowledge about the spatiotemporal
trajectory of a user, and yet allow uniquely pinpointing his trajectory micro-data among
those of a large population. In this sense, an LBQID becomes a spatiotemporal pattern that
is unique to one individual in a database of trajectory micro-data.
The demonstration of such a conjecture is provided by the seminal work of De Montjoye
et al. [40], who show that minimal LBQIDs, i.e., very little positioning side information,
1The definition is inspired by the literature on privacy in traditional relational databases. There, each record is
associated with some data values, and a set of quasi-identifiers: for instance, in a renowned study Sweeney [124]
analyses a database of all US citizens, where their individual healthcare records (i.e., the actual data, includ-
ing admit/discharge dates, diagnoses, cures, and charges) are stored along with three quasi-identifiers (i.e., date
of birth, gender, and ZIP code). The author finds that 87% of individuals have a unique combination of the
three quasi-identifiers above, which clearly raises questions on the privacy of the dataset. In databases of tra-
jectory micro-data, there is no clear distinction between quasi-identifiers and the actual data, as any portion of
the spatiotemporal trajectory itself can become a quasi-identifier, depending on the positioning side information
possessed by an adversary. The formal definition of LBQID captures this condition.
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is sufficient to carry out successful linkage attacks against trajectory micro-data. Specifi-
cally, De Montjoye et al. [40] prove that knowledge of a few random points in the trajectory
micro-data of a user allow pinning him down almost certainly, even within a very large
population2. For instance, an adversary having observed the whereabouts of a target indi-
vidual at two random moments (whose corresponding spatiotemporal points are present
in the target database) during a whole year has a 50% probability of recognizing his target
in a dataset of millions; the percentage grows to 95% if as little as four random points are
known to the attacker. Figure 9 shows the exact dynamics of unicity versus the number
of haphazard spatiotemporal points in the side information, in the scenario studied by De
Montjoye et al. [40].
The works above analyse mobile phone trajectories, but unicity is a general characteristic
of trajectory micro-data, no matter their original source. This is confirmed by subsequent
works that test the effectiveness of linkage attacks against trajectory micro-data collected
in a variety of ways. Rossi et al. [112] investigate unicity in GPS traces3, and show that
the high spatial accuracy (in the order of meters) of this kind of trajectory micro-data ex-
hacerbates the phenomenon. Indeed, 100% of the users in the datasets are pinpointed with
just two random spatiotemporal points. Sapiezynski et al. [115] employ Wi-Fi trajectory
micro-data4 and demonstrate that knowing as little as 0.1% of the APs seen by a user (i.e.,
around 20 APs on average) allows tracking down a typical user during 90% of her move-
ments. De Montjoye et al. [41] confirm that unicity persists also in the case of trajectory
micro-data from digital payments5. In this context, 90% of users are unique by assuming
knowledge of four random points in their trajectory micro-data. Interestingly, the authors
also show that unicity varies with gender (women being 1.2 times more prone to unicity
than men) and income level (high-income users being 1.7 times more prone to unicity than
low-income ones): the authors speculate that the reason lies in the entropy of shops, i.e., the
variety of different shopping locations visited, which is higher in women and high-income
individuals.
2.3 Record linkage via diverse sampling of trajectory micro-data
As mentioned in Section 2.1, in practical cases the background knowledge of the adversary
is hardly a subset of the target trajectory micro-data. Instead, the attacker collects side
information from a different source, which typically has a spatiotemporal sampling of the
actual trajectory of the target individuals that is different from that in the target database.
This maps to class O.1/F.1b in Table 1.
An example is portrayed in Figure 6. Here, record linkage attacks require reconciliating
spatiotemporal trajectories that are not one a subset of the other, making the problem more
challenging. A first set of solutions is proposed in a seminal work by Ma et al. [89], who
2The dataset is composed of CDRs of 1.5 million users, collected by a mobile network operator during 15
months.
3The study leverages three different types of GPS trajectory micro-data, from CabSpotting [106] CenceMe [99]
and GeoLife [147]. The three datsets cover 536, 20 and 182 users, respectively, for several weeks and with diverse
sampling frequencies. A subset of the original data, of variable size, is used as side information; the complement
data is used as target trajectory micro-data.
4The data consists of Wi-Fi scans of 63 users, obtained by storing the list of APs that respond to probe messages
broadcasted by the users’ mobile devices. As AP locations are easily obtained from services such as Google
Geolocation API, timestamped Wi-Fi scans are a form of client-centric trajectory micro-data. The authors also use
GPS traces of the same users as ground truth.
5The work used 3 months of credit card transactions for 1.1 million users, collected in 10,000 geo-referenced
shops nationwide.
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devise four different estimators to measure the similarity of mobility traces in trajectory
micro-data and diversely sampled side information6. These are (i) a Maximum Likelihood
Estimator based on Euclidean distances, (ii) a Minimum Square Approach computing the
negative sum of the squared absolute value of the trajectory difference, (iii) a Basic Ap-
proach that assumes Gaussian-noisy side information and defines identity between two
spatiotemporal points based on the standard deviation of such noise, and (iv) a Weighted
Exponential Approach that generalizes the previous technique to any noise distribution.
The methods achieve a linkage success rate of 50%, when the adversary owns as little as 10
observations of the original trajectory. The result then confirms the high privacy risks as-
sociated to trajectory micro-data, even when the side information does not precisely match
the spatiotemporal points in the target database.
A similar study is carried out by Rossi and Musolesi [111] in the case of location-based
social networks (LBSNs), where localised and timestamped check-ins of individual users
result in trajectory micro-data7. The authors show that a classifier based on a modified
Hausdorff distance between trajectories allows linking between 30% and 60% of the users
in the trajectory micro-data with 10 LBSN check-ins. Further evaluations of this approach
with different datasets3 are presented by Rossi et al. [112], with improved success probabil-
ities over 90%.
While the previous studies approximate diversely sampled side information by perturb-
ing or splitting the trajectory micro-data, further experiments consider the more realistic
case where trajectory micro-data and side information come from two sources that are ac-
tually different. That boundary is first crossed by Tockar [127], who carries out a linkage
attack against trajectory micro-data of cabs in New York City, US8. Tockar [127] proves that
the unicity of taxi trips makes them easily linked to other databases that contain informa-
tion about taxi rides of specific individuals. To this end, he gathers an ad-hoc database by
browsing gossip blogs and collecting where and when celebrities used yellow cabs in the
NYC area in 2013. Linkage of spatiotemporal points allows the author to re-identify VIP
passengers in the trajectory micro-data, and hence the origin or destination of their trips,
as well as the associated tip amount. The latter are treated as the sensitive information,
unveiling frequently visited locations of celebrities, as well as their (lack of) generosity in
tipping. Although these pieces of information are deemed “relatively benign” by the au-
thor, the trial represents a first clear example of actual privacy breach through a linkage
attack on trajectory micro-data.
Cecaj et al. [27, 28] employ a real-world dataset of trajectory micro-data, and use geo-
tagged social network metadata as side information9. By applying a simple statistical
learning approach based on matching and mismatching of spatiotemporal points in the
trajectories, they can link tens of social network usernames to specific trajectory micro-data
records. The result is in fact merely probabilistic, as it is not based on actual ground truth
6Three pseudonymised GPS traces are considered in the study: 536 cabs in San Francisco from CabSpot-
ting [106], 2,348 buses in Shanghai and 4,438 cabs in Shanghai. The side information is generated by adding
noise to randomly sampled portions of the trajectory micro-data.
7The data is crawled from three different LBSNs, i.e., Brightkite and Gowalla [35], and Foursquare [57], and
covers users in three US cities, i.e., San Francisco, New York and Los Angeles, for several months. The location
information is approximated by the check-in venue in the first two datasets, while it corresponds to the actual
user position in the third one. In each LBSN, a subset of the data is used as side information, and the rest as the
target trajectory micro-data.
8The data comprises pickup and drop-off times and locations, fare and tip amounts of every yellow cab ride in
New York City, US, in 2013. The dataset, released by the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission under
Freedom of Information Law (FOIL), is pseudonymised.
9The trajectory micro-data consist of pseudonymised CDRs of 2 million mobile subscribers, while the side
information are timestamped and geo-referenced posts of 700 usernames crawled from Flickr and Twitter.
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(i.e., the identity – as social network username – of users in the trajectory micro-data): in-
stead, a maximum a-posteriori estimation is used to compute the match probability. A sim-
ilar evaluation approach is considered by Kondor et al. [81], who investigate the matchability
of large-scale datasets of trajectory micro-data10. To this end, they define space and time
thresholds tailored towards the characteristics of urban movements, and identify matching
points (which are within the aforementioned thresholds) and alibis (which are within the
threshold in time, but not in space) in trajectory pairs across the two datasets. Then, each
trajectory in one dataset is linked to that with the highest number of matching points and no
alibis on the other dataset. According to the results, the authors expect a successful match
for around 8% of users in one-week datasets, and for about 33% in one-month datasets.
Such percentages grow to 15% and 60% respectively, when focusing on very active, regular
users only.
A more elaborate approach and dependable evaluation are proposed by Riederer et al. [110],
who design a dedicated algorithm for linking trajectory micro-data and social network
metadata. The algorithm starts by computing a score for each pair of users across the two
databases, representing the likelihood of the user pair being actually the same person; it
then maximizes the overall score via a bipartite matching. The algorithm is proven to be
theoretically correct under the assumption that visits to a specific location during a cer-
tain period follow a Poisson distribution and are independent of other visits. Tests with
real-world datasets11 show that the algorithm outperforms approaches based on sparsity,
frequency of visit and density, reaching up to 0.95 precision and 0.7 recall in the best case.
The first test at scale is that recently performed by Wang et al. [138]. They leverage an
impressive collection of large-scale real-world datasets12 to carry out a comparative anal-
ysis of record linkage attacks proposed in the literature, including those by Ma et al. [89],
Rossi and Musolesi [111], Cecaj et al. [27, 28], and Riederer et al. [110]. All these strate-
gies achieve hit precisions sensibly higher than zero, hence they can successfully link users
across databases. However, and quite interestingly, the results show that the performance
of these strategies in presence of large-scale real-world datasets are reduced with respect
to those reported in the original papers, with hit precisions well below 20% even when
the side information comprises tens of spatiotemporal points. The authors’ explanation is
that each attack only addresses a subset of the issues emerging in practical settings, which
mostly stem from spatiotemporal mismatches between target and side information data,
and from database sparsity. They then propose an attack technique that leverages a prob-
abilistic representation of the spatiotemporal mismatch and uses a simple Markov model
to estimate missing spatiotemporal points. The approach achieves a substantial gain in
linking records, with a maximum hit ratio of 40%.
10They use CDRs of 2.8 million mobile subscribers in Singapore, and smart card bus/train transportation data
of 3.3 million users collected by the Singapore Land Transportation Authority (LTA). The two atasets are collected
in the same time period.
11Three different pairs of trajectory micro-data databases are employed, i.e., 862 users in two databases crawled
from Foursquare and Twitter, 1717 users in two databases crawled from Instagram and Twitter, and 452 users in
CDR and credit card record databases. In each scenario, all databases are pseudonymised, but the ground-truth
mapping of users between the two databases is known.
12Three types of datasets are considered in the study: mobile network CDRs of more than 2 million subscribers,
which is the target trajectory micro-data; GPS data of 56,000 Weibo social network users; check-in locations of
10,000 Weibo and 45,000 Dianping application users. All datasets are collected during the same week, and the
side information datasets only contain users who are also present in the target CDR database. User pseudonyms
are consistent across the datasets, which allows validate the results of record linkage attacks on ground truth.
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2.4 Record linkage via mobility models
A different attack surface for linkage is represented by indirect knowledge inferred from
trajectory micro-data. Let us imagine an adversary who does not have access to precise
spatiotemporal points of his target’s trajectory micro-data, but knows instead some profiles
that characterize the movements of his target. Such an attacker could then extract the same
profiles for all records in the trajectory micro-data, and try to link a specific record to his
side information. Figure 7 illustrates this concept.
Mobility models are the first type of profile that has been considered in the literature, as
per class O.1/F.2a in Table 1. The strong regularity that is known to characterize human
movements [64] allows constructing simple models of individual movements that approxi-
mate well the actual mobility patterns, and that thus represent a valuable side information.
The early work by De Mulder et al. [42] is especially influential in this sense. The authors
assume that an adversary owns a Markovian model of his target’s mobility; the model
describes memoryless transition probabilities among visited locations. The authors then
propose two matching strategies: the first builds a Markovian model from each record in
the target trajectory micro-data, and then compares the Markovian models directly; the sec-
ond calculates the probability that the specific sequence of locations in each record of the
trajectory micro-data is generated by the side information Markovian model. Evaluations
with real-world data13 show that the linkage is successful in 80% of cases. Although the
scale of the experiment is small, the result still demonstrates that a risk exists.
Markovian representations of mobility have been then considered as the side information
by several follow-up studies. Shokri et al. [119] assume an adversary who aims at linking
transition probability matrices to whole trajectories in a dataset of trajectory micro-data14
via a maximum likelihood approach. Gambs et al. [56] consider a wide range of techniques
to pair Markovian models with trajectories in the target trajectory micro-data. Tests with
heterogeneous datasets15 result in a success ratio of linkage attacks between 10% and 50%.
Interestingly, the authors show that the percentages grow proportionally with the sampling
rate of the trajectory micro-data. Murakami et al. [98] investigate the case where the side in-
formation possessed by the attacker is limited and possibly collected from a non-identical
set of users. These conditions result in transition probability matrices of the Markovian
models that are sparse and erroneous. In this scenario, previous techniques for linkage,
such as the maximum likelihood used by Shokri et al. [119], do not perform well. The au-
thors then propose an attack that (i) reduces the problem dimension by means of group
sparsity regularization (i.e., clustering) of the locations visited by users, and (ii) estimates
the complete transition probability matrices via a dedicated factorization of the tensor com-
posed by all side-information (sparse) transition matrices. Tests with real-world datasets16
13The study employs a processed version of the Reality Mining dataset [49]. Individual spatiotemporal trajec-
tories of 100 volunteers are recovered from the entry and exit time of each user at GSM cells. Side information is
constructed from two months of mobility, wheras another two months are used as target trajectory micro-data.
14The trajectory micro-data comprises 20 mobility traces from the CabSpotting dataset [106], where the sam-
pling frequency is fixed at 5 minutes over 8 hours. Users move within the San Francisco bay area, which is
divided into 40 regions forming a 5 × 8 grid. Side-information Markovian models are directly extracted from
noisy subsets of the trajectory micro-data.
15The study employs GPS logs from five different scenarios, i.e., Arum [79], GeoLife [147], Nokia [80], San
Francisco cabs [106], and Borlange [54]. All datasets describe individual spatiotemporal trajectories, covering
from a few users to almost two hundred individuals. Side information Markov models are extracted from a
subset of eacj dataset, while the rest is considered as the trajectory micro-data for linkage.
16The authors employ data from 80 GeoLife users [147], 250 Gowalla users [35], and 400 Foursquare users [141].
All datasets cover tens of months of trajectory micro-data. The side information is computed from 1.5% to 9% of
the individual data, and the remaining data is used as the target trajectory micro-data.
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Figure 10: Fraction of population (x axis) whose home (green
squares), work (red circles) or both home and work (black tri-
angles) locations (at census tract level) are shared with at most
y other individuals. While the set of people sharing the same
home or work places are typically large (in the order of tens
or hundreds at least), more than 5% of workers do not share
their combination of home and work locations with any other
individual in the US. Figure from Golle and Partridge [63].
prove the effectiveness of the solution, which attains around 70% AUC (Area Under the
Curve) of the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) of the true positive rate against the
false positive rate.
2.5 Record linkage via important locations
Another class of trajectory micro-data profile used as side information are locations that are
frequently visited by the users, which maps to class O.1/F.2b in Table 1. The most intuitive
example is that of home and work locations. Such an apparently basic knowledge poses in
fact a very severe risk to privacy: Golle and Partridge [63] show that the home and work
locations of over 100 million individuals in the US, collected by the Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics (LEHD) program, suffer from unicity. Namely, more than 5% of the
population shows unique home-work location pairs at tract granularity. Figure 10 provides
a complete view of the result.
Based on this observation, in his seminal work, Krumm [83] leverages home location side
information to run linkage attacks on trajectory micro-data17. The author proposes four
simple heuristic algorithms to infer the latitude and longitude of home locations of each
pseudonymised user whose trajectories are stored in a given trajectory micro-data record.
He then performs a reverse lookup for the home location in the side information: if a unique
matching entry is present, the attack allows linking the trajectory micro-data record to an
identity. In the considered scenario, the chance of success for an adversary is at least 5%.
The study is extended to the case where the attacker has side information about both home
and work locations by Freudiger et al. [54]. Their linkage attack infers home and work
locations in trajectory micro-data by: (i) clustering spatial points that map to frequently
visited locations, via a variant of k-means; (ii) tagging the most popular location overnight
as home, and that during working hours as work. The unicity of home and work locations
allows pinpointing users in real-world datasets18 with probabilities from 10% to 90%.
Zang and Bolot [144] consider a more generic notion of important locations, as the top
n locations that are most frequently visited by a user, where n is a small number. They
show that such side information is sufficient to distinguish a large fraction of users among
millions others19. In their tests, 50% of the individuals can be singled out by considering
17The analysis is based on two-week (or longer) GPS trajectory micro-data of 172 volunteers. The side infor-
mation is easily obtained from an online “white pages” service, which provides an association between the name
and home address of individuals. The ground truth are the actual home and work locations of the volunteers,
who communicated them as part of the experiment.
18The study uses data from two-year GPS mobility of 24 cars in Borlange, Sweden and one-year GPS mobility
of 143 users in Lausanne, Switzerland [80]. Home and work side information is artificially obtained by selecting
a limited subset of points from each user trace, via different subsampling strategies, and then applying the same
heuristic described above.
19The study is performed on Call Detail Records (CDRs) of a nationwide US mobile network operator, col-
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Figure 11: Fraction of trajectories (x-axis) that share the top one (blue), two (red) or three
(green) most frequently visited locations with at most y other trajectories in the target
database. Plots refer to different spatial granularity levels with decreasing resolution: (a)
US census sector, (b) network cell, and (c) US ZIP code. While no trajectory is unique when
considering that only the top visited location is known to the attacker, all other situations
allow the adversary to perform successful record linkage on 5% (top two locations known
at a ZIP code level) to 85% (top three locations known at a sector level) of the trajectories of
20 million users. Figure from Zang and Bolot [144].
the top 3 mobile network cells they are observed at, and linkage is shown to be successful
also at different spatial granularity levels. Figure 11 portrays complete results for n ∈ [1, 3].
Alternative versions of the trajectory micro-data profile of Zang and Bolot [144] are pro-
posed in subsequent works by Unnikrishnan and Naini [133], Naini et al. [101], Goga et
al. [62], and Rossi and Musolesi [111]. In the first study, Unnikrishnan and Naini [133]
investigate the case where the adversary’s side information is in the form of histograms
of the time spent by users at different locations. Once comparable histograms are derived
from the target trajectory micro-data, linkage is formulated as a matching problem on a
bipartite graph where vertices represent records in the two datasets, and a maximum like-
lihood technique is used to solve it. Their evaluation20 results in a success probability of
more than 50% of the subject when using one day per week, and of 70% when considering
two days. A generalization of the study is later proposed by Naini et al. [101], for the case
where the sets of individuals in the side information and target trajectory micro-data are
not identical.
The approach is similar in the work by Goga et al. [62], where the frequency histograms,
called location profiles, are computed at ZIP-code geographic granularity, and weighted
so that locations that are less common across all profiles but more representative of spe-
cific profiles are valued more. The similarity between histograms is computed using a
Cosine distance, as other similarity metrics are shown to yield little difference in results.
Interestingly, the authors employ target and side information trajectory micro-data from
actual different databases21, and show that their attack strategy is highly effective, linking
records with 40% to 80% of true positives and 1% of false positives. Finally, Rossi and
lected over a month and describing the spatiotemporal trajectories of approximately 20 million subscribers. Side-
information on mportant locations is directly extracted from the same data used as target trajectory micro-data.
20The authors employ trajectory micro-data from Wi-Fi access to geo-referenced APs by over a thousand stu-
dents in the campus of EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland. The data covers Mondays and Tuesdays in two weeks. The
histogram side information is inferred from days in the first week of the trajectory micro-data, while days in the
second week are used in their original format as the target dataset for linkage.
21The databases are crawled from Flickr, Twitter, and Yelp. Ground truth on the identity of users appearing
across databases is built by looking for accounts in the three platforms that are associated to a same e-mail address,
for all addresses mined from a very large e-mail dataset. The final datasets include check-in data of 232,000
Twitter users (used as the target trajectory micro-data), 22,000 Flickr users and 28,000 Yelp users (used as side
information).
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Figure 12: Average percent unicity of trajectories in terms of their mean travelled distance
(red circles), speed (blue crosses), or direction of movement (green stars) over time win-
dows of 30 seconds. Unicity is portrayed versus the number of distance, speed or direction
feature points in the adversary’s side information. The three plots refer to different datasets:
CabSpotting [106] (left), CenceMe [99] (middle), and GeoLife [147] (right). Unicity typically
rises well above 50% with just a few known feature points, and travel direction appers to
be the most distinguishing feature. Figure from Rossi et al. [112].
Musolesi [111] assume a slightly different form of side information, i.e., (time-dependent)
distributions of visit frequencies at different locations. They leverage a (time-dependent)
multinomial naı¨ve Bayes model to match the adversary knowledge to equivalent distri-
butions extracted from trajectory micro-data. Experimental tests7 show that the proposed
attack has an accuracy between 40% and 90%, depending on the dataset, when the adver-
sary knowledge is built from just 10 spatiotemporal points from each record in the original
trajectory micro-data.
2.6 Record linkage via mobility features
A couple of works examine situations where the side information consists in specific fea-
tures that characterize the movements of individuals, hence falling in class O.1/F.2c in
Table 1. Rossi et al. [112] assume that the adversary possesses knowledge of the travelled
distance, average speed, and heading direction collected during a number n of different
(and typically small) time window. This is equivalent to replacing spatiotemporal points
with distance, speed or heading points in the linkage attack. As all these features are easily
inferred from trajectory micro-data records, they can then be mapped to the side informa-
tion. The authors demonstrate that knowledge of these features poses an equivalent pri-
vacy risk to that of regular spatiotemporal points. Tests with real-world trajectory micro-
data3 demonstrate that unicity can reach values up to 95%, although there is significant
variability across datasets and feature types. Performance are summarized in Figure 12.
Another case where features are retained as side information is the peculiar scenario en-
visioned by Zan et al. [143], who focus on vehicular trajectory micro-data. Their side infor-
mation is represented by features that characterize the driving style of each individual. An
attack is proposed that builds on classic machine learning models to classify vehicles in the
trajectory micro-data based on type (car, truck, motorcycle). The performance evaluation
shows that this classification is already sufficient to significantly reduce diversity in real-
world fine-grained vehicular movement traces22, hence making the unicity problem more
severe.
22Vehicular trajectory micro-data are collected by NGSIM on the US101 highway [2], during 10 minutes. Side
information comprises profiles of speed, acceleration, lane changing, and headway distance of each vehicle.
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2.7 Record linkage via social graphs
In a distinctive study, Srivatsa and Hicks [122] consider social graphs as a profile side in-
formation, i.e., class O.1/F.2d in Table 1. The assumption of the authors is that physical
encounters are more frequent among friends: hence, a contact graph derived from trajec-
tory micro-data is tightly correlated to a social graph such as that obtained by crawling
friendships in social networks. Under this condition, it is then possible for an adversary
to link names in the social graph with records in the trajectory micro-data, by extracting
a contact graph from the latter. Their proposed attack aims at linking nodes in the two
graphs: it takes as an input the pseudonymised contact graph, where a small number of
nodes, called landmarks, are de-anonymized either by leveraging centrality features or by
exploiting leaked information. Starting from landmarks, the method completes the map-
ping between graphs using distance vectors, spanning tree matching or local subgraph
features. The output mapping allows assigning social network identifiers to the spatiotem-
poral trajectories in trajectory micro-data. Evaluations with real-world datasets23 show
that the attack can achieve a high accuracy above 80%; however, it is important to note that
the result holds when considering a relatively small user base (less than 125 individuals),
and that the scalability of the attack to much larger datasets is unclear. Improvements to
the approach have been recently proposed by Ji et al. [76, 77], yet they do not address the
questions on scalability.
2.8 Record linkage via auxiliary side information
Auxiliary data that is unrelated to the movements of the target individual may also be
exploited during attacks on trajectory micro-data. The nature of the auxiliary information
is potentially very diverse.
For instance, one could consider as auxiliary data the knowledge of whether the target
person is actually present in the database under attack; in fact, this piece of information is
typically taken for granted in the works reviewed in the previous Sections, hence all previ-
ously discussed attacks implicitly leverage auxiliary data in a sense. As another example,
in the case where attacks occur against anonymized datasets, knowledge of the privacy-
preserving transformation used to protect the trajectory micro-data can also be regarded
as auxiliary information; this type of auxiliary data is instead never part of the adversary’s
side information in the attacks surveyed in the present Section, which are only run on
pseudonimyzed datasets.
A couple of works in the literature show how auxiliary side information impacts the unic-
ity of trajectory micro-data in practical case studies, and fall in class O.1/F.3 in Table 1.
Zang and Bolot [144] show that unicity in real-world large-scale trajectory micro-data 19
is sensibly increased when the auxiliary data consists of minimal social information about
the target user. Namely, they assume that the adversary also knows whether his target in-
dividual is especially social or not, i.e., he calls more than 20 unique persons in a month
or otherwise. This notion is also included as a flag field in each record of the target trajec-
tory micro-data database. Knowledge of this auxiliary one-bit piece of information permits
unicity increase by around 50% on average in the million-strong dataset considered in the
23The analysis leverages trajectory micro-data in the form of individual trajectories from geo-referenced associ-
ations of mobile devices with Wi-Fi APs in the university campus of St Andrews, UK [17]. The side information is
derived from Facebook friendship relationships of the same set of student volunteers in the trajectory micro-data.
Ground-truth information, mapping Facebook identities to mobility traces, is also provided by the experiment
participants. Other case studies are also investigated, which however do not concern contact graphs from trajec-
tory micro-data.
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study. De Montjoye et al. [41] examine instead the case where auxiliary purchase cost data
is associated to each spatiotemporal point in trajectory micro-data from credit card trans-
actions5. If the adversary happens to be able to associate a purchase cost to each of the
target’s trajectory point he knows, his chances of success grow by 22% on average.
The auxiliary data leveraged by Goga et al. [62] consists instead of language and timing
information, which is used to complement the important locations that represent the ad-
versary’s baseline side information. Tests with different real-world datasets21 reveal that
such an auxiliary information allows for mild improvements of re-identification rates: in
particular, knowing the language of individuals does not help pinpointing users in a more
accurate way than just relying on important location profiles.
2.9 Attribute linkage via subset of trajectory micro-data
We now move to a different category of attacks, whose objective is not record linkage but
attribute linkage. These map to class O.2/F.1a in Table 1. In this case, the adversary ex-
ploits a weakness of databases that is referred to as homogeneity, and is subtler than unicity.
Hence, as mentioned in Section 2.1.1, attribute linkage attacks are also called homogeneity
attacks in the literature.
In order to clarify the privacy risk associated with homogeneity, let us consider a trajec-
tory micro-data database where unicity is completely absent, and each record contains in
fact trajectory micro-data that cannot be told apart from those of a large number of other
records. In this case, any side information always matches many records, and a linkage
with the correct record has low chances of success. However, recall that the ultimate goal
of an adversary is the re-identification of the sensitive information within a record, and not
of the record itself. And, the fact that the trajectory micro-data in each record are not unique
does not necessarily imply the same for the sensitive part of the database. Homogeneity is
precisely the lack of diversity in the sensitive information across the set of indistinguish-
able trajectory micro-data records. In other words, it can be understood as an extension of
unicity to the level of combined trajectory data and sensitive attributes, rather than at the
trajectory level only.
As depicted in Figure 4, attribute linkage attacks exploit homogeneity. The figure refers to
the case where sensitive attributes are specific attribute fields in each record, separated from
the spatiotemporal points; yet, attribute linkage can be also cast to the other perspective
outlined in Section 2.1.1, where sensitive information is embedded in the spatiotemporal
trajectory of the user.
To date, there are no investigations of attribute linkage attacks against trajectory micro-
data databases that also contain separate fields with sensitive information. Instead, a recent
work by Sui et al. [123] explores the case where the sensitive knowledge is embedded in the
trajectory micro-data. More precisely, this study assumes that the two most frequently lo-
cations visited by an individual are sensitive implicit attributes in trajectory micro-data.
Considering that the side information of an adversary consists in three random spatiotem-
poral points, the authors show that real-world trajectory micro-data24 is affected by signif-
icant homogeneity. Namely, 35% of records in their database are not unique, but 40% of
such non-unique records are homogeneous. An interesting observation is that homogene-
ity scales exponentially with the number of indistinguishable records in the considered
scenario: the problem may thus be naturally overcome in fairly large sets of records with
24The evaluation employs association logs of 150,000 users to 2,670 APs of the Wi-Fi network of Tsinghua Uni-
versity, China. The side information is retrieved from the target trajectory micro-data, as a subset of the same.
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identical trajectory micro-data.
2.10 Probabilistic attacks via subset of trajectory micro-data
Probabilistic attacks are the third type of threat against trajectory micro-data that has been
considered in the literature, and correspond to class O.3/F.1a in Table 1. In this case, the
adversary is successful if, upon accessing the database, his knowledge of the target indi-
viduals’ trajectories is increased by any non-negligible amount. In a sense, probabilistic
attacks can be understood as a generalization of attribute linkage: while the latter leverage
the homegeneity of specific attributes (deemed to be sensitive), the former can take advan-
tage of the homogeneity of any field in the database. Therefore, probabilistic attacks have
a significantly broader scope than record or linkage attacks. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
The concept of probabilistic attacks against trajectory micro-data is evoked in a recent
work by Gramaglia et al. [65], under the simple assumption of a spatiotemporal subset for-
mat obtained from intra-record subsampled data25. Although they conceptually introduce
the threat, the authors do not run attacks on actual data. In conclusion, we currently lack
a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of probabilistic attacks in the context of
trajectory micro-data, which limits the current understanding of the actual risks entailed
by this kind of adversarial strategy.
3 Anonymization of trajectory micro-data
In the second part of the survey, we turn our attention to the different techniques adopted
in order to protect databases of trajectory micro-data from the attacks against user privacy
presented in Section 2. We first propose a taxonomy of the anonymization solutions in the
literature, in Section 3.1; this allows us to then structure the subsequent detailed discussion
of relevant works, in Sections 3.2 to 3.4.
3.1 A taxonomy of anonymization techniques
Anonymization techniques are primarily characterized by the privacy principle they seek to
implement in the data. A privacy principle expresses some conditions on the maximum
knowledge that can be gained by the attacked upon accessing the target database. Two
major privacy principles have been considered in the literature, as far as the anonymization
of trajectory micro-data is concerned.
• Indistinguishability commends that each record in a database must not be distinguish-
able from a large enough group of other records in the same database, called anonymity
set. In the context of trajectory micro-data, the principle implicitly assumes that the
adversary’s knowledge is limited to some portion of the movement of the target in-
dividual. In this case, it ensures that such an adversary will not be able to pinpoint
a single trajectory in the target database; instead, the attacker will retrieve the whole
batch of indistinguishable trajectories of all users in the anonymity set. Ultimately,
the principle effectively removes unicity in trajectory micro-data. Extensions to the
baseline principle can also tackle homogeneity, making indistinguishability a sound
countermeasure against record and attribute linkage attacks.
25The study leverages CDR datasets provided by mobile network operators and describing two-week-long
spatiotemporal trajectories of subscribers in the cities of Abidjan (29,191 users), Dakar (71,146) and Shenzhen
(50,000), and in the countries of Ivory Coast (82,728) and Senegal (286,926).
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Figure 13: Example of mix-zones model. Every user
entering the mix-zone changes the current pseudo-
identifier (e.g., a) with a new, never used before,
random pseudo-identifier (e.g., l). This ensures the
unlinkability of the user when exiting the mix-zone
(e.g., the adversary does not know which of the out-
going trajectories is that of the user who entered the
mix-zone as a).
• Uninformativeness enforces that the difference between the knowledge of the adver-
sary before and after accessing a database must be small. This is a much more gen-
eral principle that does not make any assumption on the adversary knowledge. This
principle is suitable to address probabilistic attacks, hence providing much stronger
privacy guarantees than indistinguishability.
In addition to the principles above, a substantial amount of works adopt less rigorous pri-
vacy notions, and we group those under the following separate class.
• Mitigation aims at reducing circumstantial privacy risks associated with the data,
without pursuing a well-defined privacy principle.
The privacy principles above constitute the first dimension of our taxonomy, reflected in
the first column in Table 2. Note, however, that privacy principles are abstract definitions.
In order to be applied in practical cases, they need to be specialized into privacy criteria
that define the exact requirements that a database needs to meet in order to comply with
the principle. Privacy criteria are categorized as per the second column of Table 2. Next,
we provide brief primers on each privacy principle, possibly introducing the key criterion
used to implement it in the literature. Then, we discuss in detail mitigation techniques in
Section 3.2, approaches based on indistinguishability in Section 3.3, and those aiming at
uninformativeness in Section 3.4.
3.1.1 Mitigation of privacy risks via mix-zones
A large body of works does not target a rigorously-defined privacy principle, rather aim at
mitigating privacy risks in trajectory micro-data. Approaches in this category propose to
add random noise to the spatiotemporal points, to reduce the spatial or temporal resolution
of the data, or to arbitrarily trim the trajectories. However, such strategies do not offer any
formal guarantee in terms of privacy.
Many mitigation proposals build on the mix-zones model originally introduced by Beres-
ford et al. [12, 13]. A mix-zone is a spatial region within which users’ spatiotemporal points
are not recorded; also, users change their pseudo-identifier every time they enter a new
mix-zone, as depicted in Figure 13. If a sufficient variety of trajectories traverses the mix-
zone, it will be difficult for the adversary to follow a target user when she leaves the mix-
zone. The heuristic nature of the mix-zone model, which does not build on any rigorous
privacy principle, is apparent: unlike k-anonymity or differential privacy, this model has
no formal definition, and its effectiveness fully depends on the number and diversity of the
specific spatiotemporal trajectories that cross a mix-zone during a particular time interval.
A number of variants of the mix-zones model exist, and we survey them, along with the
simpler solutions mentioned above, in Section 3.2.
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY ()
27
Table 2: Classification of techniques proposed in the literature to anonymize trajectory
micro-data databases. Our taxonomy is outlined by the first two columns, that tell apart
anonymization solutions based on the privacy principle they adopt, and on the privacy
criterion used to implement the principle. The last three columns indicate which class of
attack each solution aims at countering, based on the adversary’s objective (O) outlined
in Section 2.1.1. Solutions based on the three privacy principles in the leftmost column
are presented in Section 3.2 (mitigation), Section 3.3 (indistinguishability), and Section 3.4
(uninformativeness), respectively.
Attacker objective (O)
Privacy
principle
Privacy
criterion
Record linkage
(Re-identification)
O.1
Attribute linkage
(Homogeneity)
O.2
Probabilitic
(Inference)
O.3
Mitigation Obfuscation Srivatsa et al. [122]
Cloaking Hoh et al. [74]
Murakami et al. [98]
Ma et al. [89]
Rossi et al. [112]
Segmentation Song et al. [121]
Swapping Salas et al. [114]
Mix-zones Beresford et al. [12, 13]
Hoh and Gruteser [73]
Hoh et al. [75, 72]
Freudiger et al. [53]
Liu et al. [87]
Palanisamy and Liu [105]
Gao et al. [58]
Indistinguishability k-anonymity via
spatiotemporal
generalization
Yavonoy et al. [142]
De Montjoye et al. [40]
Zang et al. [144]
Gramaglia and Fiore [66]
k-anonymity via
suppression
Terrovitis and
Mamoulis [126]
k-anonymity via
generalization and
suppression
Nergiz et al. [102]
Monreale et al. [96]
Gramaglia and Fiore [66]
k-anonymity via
micro-aggregation and
suppression
Domingo-Ferrer and
Trujilo-Rasua [45]
Torres and Trujilo-Rasua [128]
Naini et al. [101]
Generalized
k-anonymity with
spatial uncertainty
Abul et al. [4]
Abul et al. [5]
Kopanaki et al. [82]
l-diversity, t-closeness Tu et al. [132, 131] Tu et al. [132, 131]
Uninformativeness (,δ)-differential privacy Shao et al. [117]
-differential privacy Chen et al. [34]
Chen et al. [33]
Bonomi and Li [22]
Qardaji et al. [107]
Zhang et al. [146]
He et al. [70]
Mir et al. [95]
Roy et al. [113]
Gursoy et al. [68]
Plausible deniability Bindschaedler and
Shokri [18]
Bindschaedler et al. [19]
kτ,-anonymity Gramaglia et al. [65] Gramaglia et al. [65]
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3.1.2 Indistinguishability via k-anonymity.
Indistinguishability is mainly implemented via k-anonymity, a privacy criterion first intro-
duced by Sweeney [125] for relational micro-data that has also found wide application with
trajectories. The idea behind k-anonymity is that any subset of the spatiotemporal points
of each user in a trajectory micro-data database shall not be distinguishable from the spa-
tiotemporal points of at least k − 1 other users in the same database. Formally:
Definition 1. Let D be a database of trajectory micro-data and LBQID the location-based
quasi-identifier associated with it, and let D[LBQID] be the set of records returned by
a query for LBQID on D. Then, D satisfies k-anonymity if and only if the records in
D[LBQID] are at least k.
The k-anonymity criterion can be implemented with many and varied techniques, from
generalization to microaggregation, and has been also augmented in several ways. These
variants map to different rows under the indistinguishability privacy principle in Table 2,
and we will discuss them in detail in Section 3.3.
3.1.3 Uninformativeness via differential privacy
Uninformativeness is typically achieved through differential privacy, whose original defini-
tion by Dwork [48] imposes that the result of a query on a differentially private database
must yield only a small variation depending on whether a specific record is present or not
in the database. Formally, -differential privacy, which is the standard form of differential
privacy, is defined as follows:
Definition 2. A randomized algorithm A offers -differential privacy if for all datasets D′
and D′′ differing in one element (|D′ −D′′| = 1), and for all subsets S of the output of A, it
holds Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] ≤ e × Pr[A(D′′) ∈ S].
The concept of “small” difference between query results is embodied by the so-called
budget parameter , which regulates the amount of diversity in the query result allowed
when removing a single individual from the database. Thus, differential privacy realizes
uninformativeness by ensuring that the additional knowledge gained by the adversary
when he accesses the database is bounded to .
An important remark is that differential privacy, as defined above, is a condition on the
algorithm used to extract information from the database, and not on the database itself.
Therefore, differential privacy is not immediately related to PPDP of trajectory micro-data,
rather to privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM). PPDM is a completely different problem
from PPDP, as it assumes that the exact operations that will be run on the database are
known a-priori, and can be included in the anonymization process. However, as we will
see, this criterion can be adapted to the case where databases of trajectory micro-data are
to be published for unspecified future mining.
Moreover, differential privacy is not the only criterion that implements uninformative-
ness. Other models, based on extensions of k-anonymity, have also been proposed. We will
review all anonymization techniques aiming at satisfying the uninformativeness principle
for PPDP of trajectory micro-data in Section 3.4.
3.1.4 Literature classification
We classify the works in the literature according to the privacy criterion they implement, as
listed in the rows of Table 2. However, we also complete our taxonomy with one additional
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dimension, orthogonal to privacy principles and criteria, i.e., the type of attack on trajec-
tory micro-data that each anonymization technique is intended to tackle. The columns of
Table 2 tell apart different attacker objectives (O), categorized according to the discussion in
Section 2.1.1. The labels within parenthesis report alternative names for these attacks that
are frequently used in the literature on anonymization: specifically, record and attribute
linkage are often referred to as re-identification and homogeneity attacks, respectively; in-
ference is the terminology typically employed to indicate probabilistic attacks.
The taxonomy in Table 2 allows us to catalogue works that propose anonymization tech-
niques for trajectory micro-data based on the combination of their underlying privacy prin-
ciple/criterion and the type of attack they are effective against. We should note that some
of the works discussed in this survey do not make their assumed attacker model explicit.
However, the proposed anonymization model description implies the type of attack they
could be used against. For example, in the cases of Torres and Trujillo-Rasua [128] and
Kopanaki et al. [82], the proposed k-anonymity models naturally protect against record
linkage attacks, even if not specified in the papers.
Although fairly sparse, the table highlights how the vast majority of the literature is
focused on mitigating or preventing record linkage on published databases of trajectory
micro-data. Also, some expected correlations emerge: indistinguishability is mostly suit-
able to counter record linkage, while uninformativeness tends to be used to develop solu-
tions against probabilistic attacks. Interestingly, mitigation techniques can only cope with
the simplest class of attack, i.e., record linkage, due to their heuristic nature. Variations
of these baseline matches of criterion and attack are rare, and we will detail them in our
following discussion.
3.2 Solutions providing mitigation of privacy risks
We start our review of solutions for the anonymization of trajectory micro-data by present-
ing techniques that do not implement any well-defined privacy principle, rather mitigate
privacy risks without theoretical or provable guarantees. In the following, we tell apart
such heuristic solutions based on the type of transformation they perform on the data.
3.2.1 Obfuscation
A very simple solution consists in distorting location data by adding noise to it. The value
distortion technique is originally introduced for privacy preserving data mining (PPDM)
of location data by Agrawal and Srikant [7], and later formalized as obfuscation in LBS
environments by Duckham and Kulik [47]. Srivatsa and Hicks [122] add different models
of random noise to their social-graph representations of trajectories (see Section 2.7), and
show23 that they can reduce the success of record linkage attacks in a substantial way only
if the level of noise is high.
3.2.2 Cloaking
Another baseline strategy is to reduce the granularity of the trajectory data in space or
time, which is often referred to as cloaking as per the seminal work by Gruteser and Grun-
wald [67] in LBS systems. Hoh et al. [74] show that increasing the sampling interval from
one to four minutes (i.e., only retaining every fourth sample) in their trajectory micro-data26
26Tests are conducted on real-world GPS traces of vehicles in the Detroit area, tracked during a week with a
frequency of 1 sample per minute.
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reduces home identification rates from 85% to 40%, although the risk is far from being re-
moved. Murakami et al. [98] adopt a slightly different approach, and selectively remove a
given fraction of points from the original trajectories, either randomly or so as to minimize
the opportunities for linkage by an attacker (this second option assumes knowledge of the
adversary’s side information). The authors report that, by deleting up to 5 points from
all trajectories in their reference databases16, the performance of record linkage attacks are
halved, yet remain high in absolute terms.
Ma et al. [89] tamper instead with the spatial dimension of trajectory micro-data, and show
that, in the case of their datasets6, reducing the geographical accuracy of the spatiotemporal
points does not have a clear positive effect on unicity: the chances that a record linkage
attack is successful stay above 50% when the adversary knows as little as 8 points of its
target’s mobility. In fact, in situations where the adversary knowledge is also inaccurate, a
lower granularity may even lead to increased record linkage: the authors ascribe this effect
to the fact that a coarser cell structure mitigates mistakes in the attacker’s side information.
Similar conclusions are drawn by Rossi et al. [112], who reduce the accuracy of GPS data
by truncating the longitude and latitude values to increasingly fewer decimal places: this
effectively allows them to consider geographical resolutions that range from around 1 m2
to over 10 km2. However, even at the lowest spatial granularity, 5% to 60% of users are still
unique in the considered datasets3.
3.2.3 Segmentation
A third straightforward technique is that suggested by Song et al. [121], i.e., segmenting
each trajectory and using a different pseudo-identifier for each segment. The rationale is
that the unicity of a trajectory increases with its length, hence slicing each original trajectory
into many output trajectories typically makes the latter less unique and easier to protect via
anonymization. However, the authors show this simple technique cannot reduce unicity in
a significant way: 80% of truncated trajectories in their dataset27 are still unique even when
they only span 6 consecutive hours. Moreover, this approach risks to dramatically reduce
the utility of the trajectory micro-data, preventing many analyses that require complete
movement information about each user.
3.2.4 Swapping
A recent work by Salas et al. [114] proposes a model where portions of the trajectories are
iteratively swapped among users, so that the output trajectories are in fact composed of
segments belonging to multiple actual users. The technique, named SwapMob, is remi-
niscent of the adaptive mix-zones model, however operates opportunistically on pairs of
trajectories that come close enough to be swapped, and is more suitable for PPDP. Tests
with real-life data28 demonstrate that SwapMob effectively dissociates the segments of tra-
jectories from the subject that generated them, significantly reducing the space for record
linkage. Yet, an adversary knowing 10 spatiotemporal points is still able to link 42% of the
users, and learn more than 50% of the original trajectories in 5% of cases. Also, it holds
27Experiments are conducted on CDR-based trajectories of 1.14 million users, tracked for one week, with a
sampling interval of 15 minutes.
28Experiments are run on GPS trajectories of 10, 357 taxies in Beijing, China, during one week in February 2008.
The database contains over 15 million spatiotemporal points, with an average sampling interval of 177 seconds
and 623 meters.
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again the consideration that the output trajectory micro-data does not retain any utility for
studies that require the possbility of following users for long, continued time intervals.
3.2.5 Mix-zones
As anticipated in Section 3.1.1, the mix-zones model proposed by Beresford et al. [12, 13]
is by far the most popular transformation adopted by privacy risk mitigation techniques
in trajectory micro-data. Although it is conceived for privacy-preserving LBS systems, the
model can be considered for PPDP of trajectories: it assumes that the adversary tracks its
target over time, hence it aims at protecting the whole sequence of spatiotemporal points
rather than individual points as in typical LBS privacy models.
We recall that a mix-zone is defined as a spatial region where no spatiotemporal points are
recorded for any trajectory; also, trajectories are associated with new pseudo-identfifiers as
they leave a mix-zone (see Figure 13). Therefore, the model grants unlinkability of trajec-
tories across mix-zones, but only if the number of trajectories departing from a mix-zone
during a same time interval is large enough, and if their mobility entropy (i.e., the diversity
of directions they take upon leaving the mix-zone) is sufficiently high. A single trajectory
crossing the mix zone, or the fact that many different trajectories all follow the same de-
parting route (e.g., in case of vehicles that are constrained to a limited number of roads) are
situations where the model would not offer any privacy. In other words, the entropy of
movements of users exiting a mix-zone must be high enough so that the attacker is uncer-
tain about which outgoing trajectory to follow.
As the adversary is allowed to track any user in between mix-zones, these should be
frequent enough so that no sensitive information is leaked by the intermediate mobility
patterns. Moreover, each mix-zone should be large enough (both in terms of geographical
span and of temporal duration) so as to encompass a sufficiently large anonymity set of tra-
jectories that are diverse enough upon departure from the mix-zone itself. These aspects
lead to inherent trade-offs between data utility and the level of privacy. Tests with indoor
positioning data29 show that worst-case anonymity sets only include a single trajectory in
the considered environment, even when considering long time durations of 1 hour. More-
over, when anonymity sets group multiple trajectories, those have very small entropy, and
do not offer actual protection to the users.
An enhanced version of the mix-zones model is path confusion, introduced by Hoh and
Gruteser [73]. Similarly to mix-zones, this model is designed for an LBS environment, and
aims at protecting users from an adversary who tries to link individual trajectory points
over time, so as to reconstruct complete trajectories. Instead of relying on a set of fixed
mix-zones for all trajectories, path confusion elicit that, whenever two or more users’ paths
come sufficiently close to each other, their location information is perturbed so that the ad-
versary confuses their tracks and cannot follow the same traveller anymore. This can be
seen as an adaptive version of mix-zones, which thus requires deciding on when and where
to perform confusion. In order to find the best allocation possible, the authors formulate
an optimization problem where the objective function maximizes the product of the total
point displacement by the probability that the adversary can assign points to users with
a legacy Multi-Hypothesis Tracking algorithm [108]. A simple evaluation with synthetic
29The original mix-zones model is evaluated with high-accuracy (the 95th percentile of the error is at 3 cm)
and high-frequency (positions are collected with a frequency from 1 to 10 Hz) location data collected at AT& T
Labs offices via personal trackers carried by all local researchers. The data covers the working hours over a two-
week period, and comprises over 3.4 million samples. Locations are discretized to room- and corridor-level, on a
per-floor basis.
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY ()
32
data30 shows that path confusion introduces small location errors below 16 meters. While
the original path confusion model only operates in the space dimension, Hoh et al. [75, 72]
later introduce a generalization of the path confusion model to support spatiotemporal
trajectories. They also consider more practical evaluation settings31, and show how the im-
proved model only allow for an order-of-seconds continued tracking by an attacker, while
still enabling traffic monitoring applications. We remark that a different, popular extension
to mix-zones is the camouflaging proposed by Meyerowitz and Choudhury [94]: however,
this approach is explicitly tailored for real-time location updates, hence has little relevance
to the PPDP context we focus on.
Freudiger et al. [53] propose a solution that blends the mix-zones model with cryptog-
raphy solution. In addition to the advantages offered by mix-zones, such an approach
provides users with confidentiality in message broadcasting, by offering the same secret
key to all idividuals entering a mix-zone. As in most mix-zones solutions, the achieved
privacy increases with the number of deployed mix-zones, and performance assessments
with vehicular trajectories32 demonstrate that deploying cryptographic mix-zones at 10 in-
tersections reduces the probability of successful tracking by an attacker to 10% or below,
depending on traffic density.
The problem of finding an optimal deployment for mix-zones is tackled by Liu et al. [87],
who propose heuristics that also take into account the influence of trajectory density. They
illustrate the operation of the placement strategies in real-world vehicular settings33, re-
sulting in attack success rates at around 40% when 10 mix-zones are deployed. A more
comprehensive approach is introduced by Palanisamy and Liu [105], who also take into
consideration the geometry of the mix-zones, the users’ behavior statistics, the mobility
constraints, and the temporal and spatial resolution of the location exposure. Experiments
are again carried out in a vehicular environment34, and show that including such additional
features yields substantially increased rates of ensuring a minimum size of the anonymity
set. Specifically, success rates are typically above 80% of anonymity sets of 10 users or
less. A different strategy is that by Gao et al. [58], who assume that there exist a prede-
termined set of sensitive locations, and that mix-zones are to be explicitly created around
those. They also propose a graph-theoretical technique to decide on the best linkage of
ingress and egress users at each mix-zone, based on the entry and exit timings of their
original trajectories.
As a final important observation, we recall that mix-zones and extensions of that model
are originally developed to prevent tracking in real-time LBS, but can be also applied to
PPDP since they protect spatiotemporal trajectories. One could for instance envision to
transform a dataset of trajectory micro-data by defining a set of spatial and/or temporal
regions where identifiers are changed or swapped among sets of convening users. Abiding
by the mix-zones principles, the process shall occur in a way that the mixed trajectories
yield sufficient entropy of movement outside each identifier exchange regions. The result-
ing transformed trajectories could be then published, preventing an attacker from gain-
ing knowledge of the full mobility of a given user when accessing the database. Clearly,
such a model suffers from several limitations in the context of PPDP. On the one hand, it
30The authors generate trajectories for 5 users in an area covering 1 km2.
31Tests are run on 24-hour GPS traces of 500 and 2000 probe vehicles in a 70-km2 region. These scenarios are
generated by overlaying GPS traces of 233 original cars during different days.
32The proposed solution is applied to simulated vehicles in a 10× 10 regular grid road network.
33Evaluations are conducted on GPS trajectory data collected from cabs in the San Fransisco Bay area, assuming
20 candidate locations for mix-zones deployment.
34The authors simulate the movements of 10, 000–30, 000 cars over real-world road networks.
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Table 3: Comparative roster of the main features of the techniques proposed to achieve
k-anonymization in trajectory micro-data databases. The columns indicate: (i)–(ii) the ref-
erence and acronym of the solution; (iii)–(iv) the type of trajectories they operate with and
the LBQID they assume; (v)–(vi) the approach they adopt, including the distance metric be-
tween trajectories; (vii)–(viii) typical performance figures, in terms of removed spatiotem-
poral points, and resulting data quality.
Reference Name Trajectory LBQID Approach Pairwise trajectory
distance metric
Suppressed
points
Data quality
(k = 2)
Terrovitis and
Mamoulis [126]
– Spatial (discrete) Subset of points Suppression Euclidean distance 30-50% –
Yarovoy et al. [142] – Spatial Subset of points Generalization Hilbert distance – 7-62% query
distortion
Nergiz et al. [102] – Spatiotemporal Any Generalization
& suppression
Log cost metric (LCM) 3-4% 50-90%
clustering
accuracy
Monreale et al. [96] KAM Spatial Any Generalization
& suppression
Longest common
subsequence
– 0.5-0.7 clustering
precision
Gramaglia et al. [66] GLOVE Spatiotemporal Any Generalization
& suppression
Fingerprint
stretch effort
– 1 km, 1 hour
5% 0.5 km, 40 min
Naini et al. [101] – Spatiotemporal Location
histogram
Microaggregation Normalized
information loss
– –
Torres et al. [128] – Spatiotemporal Any Microaggregation Fre´chet/Manhattan
coupling distance
29% 0.2-0.95 S/T
range query
distortion
Domingo et al. [45] – Spatiotemporal Any Microaggregation
& suppression
Synchronized
trajectory distance
80% 2.4 km, 100 min
Abul et al. [4] NWA Spatial Any Microaggregation
& suppression
Euclidean distance – Several km
Abul et al. [5] W4M Spatiotemporal Any Microaggregation
& suppression
EDR / LSTD 5-20% Several km,
several hours
Kopanaki et al. [82] WCOP Spatiotemporal Any Microaggregation
& suppression
EDR / LSTD – Several km,
several hours
does not offer any strong guarantee against traditional attacks on published data, such as
record linkage; rather, it may be seen as a way to mitigate such privacy risks. On the other
hand, similarly to techniques based on segmentation and swapping, all approaches based
on mix-zones dramatically limit the utility of trajectory micro-data for analyses that require
following users over time: indeed, they break the continuity of individual movement, and
only preserve aggregate mobility statistics.
3.3 Solutions providing indistinguishability
Indistinguishability is the first proper privacy criterion that we consider in our survey.
As already mentioned, k-anonymity is the de-facto standard privacy criterion for indis-
tinguishability in trajectory micro-data. k-anonymity is attained by transforming the spa-
tiotemporal points of the trajectories in the database, so that all points in every spatiotem-
poral trajectory are found in least k−1 other trajectories. Different types of transformations
can be applied to the spatiotemporal points, telling apart the diverse methods to implement
k-anonymity that are outlined by the first set of rows in Table 2, and that we will review in
the rest of this Section.
Table 3 provides a summary of the main features of solutions proposed in the literature
to implement k-anonymity in trajectory micro-data. It offers a quick outlook of the as-
sumptions, approach and performance of each technique, and is thus a useful reference to
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Figure 14: Example of k-anonymity via spatiotemporal generalization. (a) Original
database: user locations are represented at cell level, and the temporal information has
hourly precision. The trajectory micro-data of three users, a, b, and c are highlighted. (b)
Spatiotemporal generalization: positions are recorded at the city administrative zoning
level, and the time granularity is reduced to two hours. The trajectory micro-data of users
a and b is now indistinguishable, and those two users are 2-anonymized. (c) Increased gen-
eralization: locations are limited to the Eastern or Western half of the city, and time has
12-hour granularity. All three users are indistinguishable and 3-anonymized. Figure from
Gramaglia and Fiore [66].
start comparing different strategies for the k-anonymization of trajectory databases. Before
delving into the details of these techniques, two important remarks are in order.
First, the privacy level granted by k-anonymity is very much dependent on the value of k:
in presence of a k-anonymous database, the probability of re-identification under a random
guess by the adversary is 1/k, hence k is inversely proportional to the chance of success of
a record linkage. Yet, there is no clear consensus on which k is safe enough, and the values
adopted in the literature tend to be application-dependent. Also, it should be noted that
attaining higher k values typically reduces the utility of the trajectory micro-data, as it
requires distorting the spatiotemporal points when applying the transformation. Again,
this creates a tradeoff that is not simply solved, and is highly use-case-dependent.
Second, k-anonymity has well-known and severe limitations. Basically, this privacy cri-
terion offers strong protection against record linkage attacks only; however, it does not
remove privacy risks associated to attribute linkage or any form of probabilistic attack.
This has been repeatedly shown, considering, e.g., attacks aiming at localizing users, or
at disclosing their presence, meetings and sensitive places [119, 91, 65]. The fact that k-
anonymity has been at times misunderstood or oversold as a comprehensive solution for
PPDP of micro-data has led to diffused criticism on its use over the past years. Still, it re-
mains a sensible privacy criterion whithin its scope of application [55]. Moreover, as we
will see in the following, k-anonymity represents a basis on top of which more complex
privacy-preserving solutions can be developed, so as to counter complex attacks that go
beyond record linkage.
3.3.1 k-anonymity via spatiotemporal generalization
Spatiotemporal generalization is the baseline method used to achieve k-anonymity in trajec-
tory micro-data. It involves reducing the spatial accuracy and temporal granularity of the
spatiotemporal points in the trajectories contained in the target database, so that all points
of each trajectory are indistinguishable from the points of k − 1 other trajectories in the
same database.
An illustrative example of spatiotemporal generalization of trajectory micro-data is shown
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in Figure 14. Despite its simplicity, the example highlights how achieving k-anonymity has
a cost in terms of spatiotemporal accuracy of the database: ensuring that all trajectories
are k-anonymized may force reducing the spatial and temporal accuracy of records up to
the point where the trajectory micro-data becomes useless. Several works have quanti-
fied such a tradeoff between privacy and utility, when enforcing k-anonymity on trajec-
tory micro-data. Zang and Bolot [144] investigate how unicity decreases as the spatial
granularity of a trajectory micro-data database is lowered; this is equivalent to assess-
ing which reduction of geographical accuracy is needed to attain 2-anonymity, i.e., the
minimum level of k-anonymity that removes unicity and grants indistinguishability. The
study unveils how unicity is very hard to eliminate from spatiotemporal trajectories: if the
three most frequently visited locations are known to the attacker, the only safe choice that
grants 2-anonymity is to just publish user movements among US States, even for very large
databases19.
A more thorough evaluation is carried out by De Montjoye et al. [40], who establish an em-
pirical relation between unicity and the spatiotemporal resolution of the trajectory micro-
data dataset2. They find that unicity decreases as a power law of both spatial and temporal
granularity, which implies that the cost, in terms of utility loss, increases extremely quickly
as larger fractions of trajectories in a same dataset are 2-anonymized; hence, 2-anonymizing
the last percentile of trajectories can have a cost that is orders of magnitude higher than that
required to 2-anonymize the first percentile. Even worse, the exponent of such a power law
relationship decreases linearly with the number of spatiotemporal points known to the at-
tacker: a few additional points make k-anonymization much more expensive in terms of
generalization.
The reasons behind the high cost of k-anonymization in trajectory micro-data are studied
by Gramaglia and Fiore [66]. They show that spatiotemporal trajectories in large databases35
typically have a substantial fraction of points that are easily generalized into those of a
single other trajectory in the same database; however, they also have a small but non-
negligible set of points that are very unique, and hard to hide into another trajectory. This
study is also the first to assess the impact of privacy levels beyond the simplest one, i.e.,
k > 2, demonstrating how higher k values induce a superlinear growth in the utility loss.
Based on these observations, the authors propose GLOVE, an algorithm that achieves k-
anonymity of trajectory micro-data via spatiotemporal generalization, at a sensibly lower
cost than the approaches by Zang and Bolot [144] and De Montjoye et al. [40]. The key idea
is to operate generalization on each spatiotemporal point individually, instead of applying
the same reduction of granularity to all points of all trajectories, as done previously. Based
on this intuition, the authors define a pairwise trajectory similarity metric named finger-
print stretch effort, which quantifies the loss of spatial and temporal granularity needed to
hide each sample of one trajectory into the closest sample of the other trajectory. Then, a
simple greedy clustering based on fingerprint stretch efforts lets GLOVE 2-anonymize a
complete trajectory micro-data database with tens of thousands of records35 while retain-
ing median resolutions of 1 km in space and 1 hour in time. Interestingly, performance
tends to improve, i.e., the data loss is reduced, as the database size grows.
All the above studies consider the k-anonymization of full-length spatiotemporal trajec-
tories, i.e., they assume that all spatiotemporal points of each trajectory must be indistin-
guishable from the points of other k−1 trajectories in the same database. Yarovoy et al. [142]
relax this challenging constraint, and study k-anonymity in a setting where a known sub-
35The authors employ two trajectory micro-data databases from two-week nationwide CDRs of 82,000 and
320,000 mobile network subscribers located in Ivory Coast and Senegal, respectively, released in the context of the
D4D Challenge [20].
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set of the points of each trajectory is used as LBQID: therefore, only that subset needs to
be k-anonymized, for each trajectory. This significantly reduces the cost of generalization,
since the LBQID contains a number of points much smaller than that in the complete trajec-
tory; however, it also introduces the new problem of selecting the so-called anonymization
group, i.e., the set of k−1 records within which the LBQID of each trajectory must be made
indistinguishable. Indeed, a careless choice may lead to a successful record linkage by an
adversary with knowledge of the LBQIDs of multiple users.
The authors then propose algorithms that select anonymization groups so as to ensure
proper k-anonymity in this scenario. A first solution identifies sets of k records based on
a Hilbert distance measure, and ensures that every trajectory in a group is generalized
with respect to all LBQIDs of all other trajectories in the same group. A second solution
operates on a per-record basis rather than on a per-group basis: for each trajectory i in
the database, it finds suitable trajectories j to enforce symmetric k-anonymization of the
LBQID, i.e., it generalizes the LBQID points of i into those of j and vice-versa. Tests with
databases featuring fixed temporal periodicity36 show that, when LBQIDs include between
5% and 50% of the total spatiotemporal points of each trajectory, the proposed schemes
achieve k-anonymity, with k from 2 to 32; however, they also induce spatial distortions that
cause 7%–62% of location-based queries to fail in the anonymized database.
3.3.2 k-anonymity via suppression
A different technique to achieve k-anonymity is suppression, which removes spatiotemporal
points from the original trajectories. Terrovitis and Mamoulis [126] propose an algorithm
that iteratively removes points from trajectories, simplifying the movement description un-
til k-anonymity is satisfied. At each iteration, all points that break k-anonymity are identi-
fied, and the one entailing minimum Euclidean distortion is selected for removal. However,
the simplicity of the solution entails strong assumptions on the trajectory micro-data for-
mat and attacker model in order to produce reasonable results: (i) trajectories are purely
spatial, i.e., do not have a temporal dimension; (ii) space is discretized in a finite num-
ber of locations; and, (iii) adversaries are in a small number, and their exact knowledge is
available and can be used as an input to the anonymization process. The latter point im-
plies that the k-anonymization is limited to a very specific set of LBQIDs, i.e., sequences
of points. These aspects are reflected in the performance evaluation, carried out with syn-
thetic data37, where 2 to 7 adversaries have side information (known to the anonymization
algorithm) of all points in 1 out of 100 total locations.
3.3.3 k-anonymity via generalization and suppression
Generalization and suppression can in fact be used jointly. In the light of the analysis by
Gramaglia and Fiore [66], suppression can be highly beneficial to k-anonymization: indeed,
discarding the small fraction of unique points may take away a substantial portion of the
diversity among trajectories, whose generalization then retains a much higher accuracy
level.
36The authors employ a real-life dataset includes GPS trajectory micro-data of cars in Milan, Italy. The data is
pre-processed to include one sample every 5 minutes, resulting in more than 45,000 trajectories and 2009 times-
tamps. A synthetic dataset is also used; it is created using Brinkhoff’s generator [24] and includes 150,000 trajec-
tories with 400 timestamps over the road-network of Oldenbur, Germany.
37The authors use 2,000 to 15,000 trajectories returned by the Brinkhoff’s moving object generator [24] in Old-
enburg, Germany.
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The first example of approach based on suppression is that by Nergiz et al. [102]. The
solution is close in spirit to GLOVE, as it also relies on per-spatiotemporal point general-
ization. However, (i) it enforces that no two points of one trajectory can be generalized with
a single point of the other trajectory, which leads to suppression in presence of trajectories
with a non-matching number of points; (ii) it is based on a different pairwise trajectory
similarity metric, named log cost metric, which scales logarithmically the loss of spatial and
temporal accuracy and accounts for suppressed points. Evaluations with real-world and
synthetic trajectory data38 show that the proposed solution can achieve 2-anonymization by
suppressing 3-4% of data, while 2-anonymization has a much higher cost typically around
25% of removed points. Although the authors do not report on exact error figures of the
anonymized trajectories in space and time, they show that the results of one specific analy-
sis, i.e., clustering, are preserved with precision and recall in the range 50-90%.
A different solution is proposed by Monreale et al. [96], which however only operates on
spatial trajectories that do not have time labels. Their strategy involves a first phase in
which space is discretized via a Voronoi tessellation: the seeds are obtained by clustering
of all spatiotemporal points in the dataset in a way that a minimum number of trajecto-
ries is ensured to flow between any two adjacent Voronoi cells. Trajectories are then all
generalized in space accroding to the voronoi tessellation. Two algorithms are proposed
for the second phase, which actually implements k-anonymity. KAM CUT is intended for
dense datasets: it first creates an efficient tree structure of trajectories, where common sub-
trajectories are the parent nodes to child nodes representing more complete (but diverse)
subtrajectories of the same users; it then traverses the tree by suppressing branches shared
by less than k trajectories. KAM REC extends the above for sparse datasets: to this end, it
tries to re-insert the pruned sub-trajectories back in the tree, by finding their longest subse-
quence of points that maps to some popular sub-trajectory either still in the tree, or shared
by at least k other trimmed sub-trajectories. Experiments are run on measurement data39,
and show that KAM CUT and KAM REC attain precision and recall that typically are in
the range 0.5-0.7, for k ∈ [2, 30]. In these tests, suppression removes between 10% (k = 2)
and 80% (k = 16) of the trajectories.
Also Gramaglia and Fiore [66] extend GLOVE so as to include suppression. This is real-
ized by removing points that induce an over-threshold generalization cost during the cal-
culation of the fingerprint stretch effort. Tests with real-world data35 show that suppressing
5% of points reduces the loss of accuracy in space and time by approximately 30-50%.
3.3.4 k-anonymity via microaggregation and suppression
Microaggregation is a family of two-step perturbative Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC)
methods that can be used to implement k-anonymity in trajectory micro-data. In the first
step (partition), the set of original trajectories is clustered based on similarity, so that each
cluster has cardinality at least k. In the second step (aggregation), the trajectories in a cluster
are replaced by a cluster prototype, computed through an operator over the spatiotemporal
points in the cluster. Overall, this effectively k-anonymizes the dataset, by making all k or
more trajectories in a same cluster identical to the prototype.
38The real dataset includes 1,000 GPS trajectories of taxis in Milan, Italy, with a total of 98,544 samples, collected
as part of the GeoPKDD project [60]. The synthetic dataset comprises 1,000 trajectories and 70,118 samples, which
are obtained using Brinkhoff’s moving object generator [24].
39The dataset consists of 5,707 GPS trajectories of cars moving around Milan, collected by the automotive service
provider Octotelematics within the GeoPKKD project [60]. Note that the trajectory micro-data is pre-processed
by splitting trajectories when two consecutive points are too far in space and time, resulting in more than 45,000
fairly space- and time-continuous trajectories in the final dataset.
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A seminal work partially based on microaggregation of spatiotemporal trajectories is that
by Domingo-Ferrer and Trujilo-Rasua [45]. The authors introduce a new pairwise trajec-
tory similarity metric, which we refer to as synchronized trajectory distance. The distance is
computed in two steps: first, trajectories are synchronized, i.e., linearly interpolated and
sampled with an identical periodicity; second, the total Euclidean distance between con-
temporary points is computed. In the case where the two trajectories span different time
intervals (i.e., the times of their first and last points do not match), all non-overlapping
points are suppressed, and the distance metric is divided by the percentage of suppressed
points as a similarity penalty. An interesting property of this metric is that it satisfies the
triangle inequality, which allows speeding up calculations of all-pair distances.
The SwapLocation algorithm employs a legacy clustering technique based on the synchro-
nized trajectory distance. Then, for each trajectory in a cluster, it swaps all of its spatiotem-
poral points with points of other trajectories in the same cluster. The exchange of points
must respect configurable thresholds in space and time, which can be seen as the maxi-
mum allowed distortion of each point in a trajctory; also, a point is suppressed if no switch
is possible under the imposed thresholds. We remark that the swap operation is not fully
consistent with the standard microaggregation strategy, however the rest of the solution is
coherent with such a model.
The authors use both synthetic and real-life datasets40 to assess the performance of SwapLo-
cation. The solution imposes significant suppression in the synthetic dataset and with
k = 10: a 1-km spatial threshold in the swap operation leads to removing 50% of tra-
jectories and 80% of points. Under a 3-km threshold, suppression is reduced to 5% for
trajectories, but it remains almost unchanged for points; moreover, the average distortion
is at 1 km approximately. In the case of real-world data, and k = 2, 29% of points are
suppressed and the mean spatial distortion is at 2.4 km. All results refer to a 100-minute
temporal granularity of the anonymized dataset.
A main limitation of the synchronized trajectory distance is its reduced capability to man-
age pairs of trajectories that do not perfectly overlap, which leads to substantial suppres-
sion of points. Torres and Trujillo-Rasua [128] propose a novel pairwise metric that is based
on the Fre´chet/Manhattan coupling distance [50] and overcomes such an issue. The metric is
based on the notion of coupling, i.e., a sequence of matching point pairs (one per trajectory)
that respects the time ordering of points and ensures that all points are considered. The
Fre´chet/Manhattan coupling distance is then the coupling that minimizes the sum of Eu-
clidean distances between matched points. Notably, the metric does not formally acount
for temporal distances between points, and its computation has a limited complexityO(pq),
where p and q are the number of points in the two input trajectories.
The Fre´chet/Manhattan coupling distance is then leveraged in a randomized clustering
algorithm, and prototype trajectories are obtained for each cluster by means of an obfus-
cation process: linear interpolation and downsampling are first used to homogenize tra-
jectories in time, and spatial averaging is then adopted to compute prototype locations at
each instant. In order to evaluate their solution, the authors employ synthetic data41 and
perform spatiotemporal range queries [129], which aim at inferring if a specific trajectory
has some or all points inside a target region during a given time interval. Distortions of
query results are between 0.2 and 0.95 for k = 2, which are lower than those induced by
40The synthetic dataset is obtained via the Brinkhoff’s moving object generator [24], and consists of 1,000 tra-
jectories which visit a total of 45,505 locations in Oldenburg, Germany. The real-life dataset consists of 4,582 GPS
cab traces collected in San Francisco, USA, with a mean of 94 points each.
41The data were generated with Brinkhoff’s moving object generator [24], and consist of 5,000 trajectories con-
taining 492,105 locations in Oldenburg, Germany, with 98,421 locations per trajectory on average.
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Figure 15: Example of (2, δ)-anonymity. Left: an original trajectory (blue solid line), the un-
certainty areas of radius δ enclosing each of its spatioemporal points, and the trajectory vol-
ume resulting from joining all uncertainty areas. An acceptable distorted motion curve for
the original trajectory is also represented (dashed red line). Right: the original spatiotem-
poral points (black dots) of two trajectories τ1 and τ2 are included into volumes (blue for τ1,
red for τ2) characterized by uncertainty δ. The inner cylindrical volume is drawn with an
uncertainty δ/2 around the arithmetic mean of the points of the two original trajectories: a
minimum translation of points within such inner volume ensures (2, δ)-anonymity. In the
example, no translation is needed since only two trajectories are concerned. Figure from
Abul et al. [4].
the approaches proposed by Nergiz et al. [102] and Domingo-Ferrer and Trujilo-Rasua [45].
A special case of microaggregation is considered by Naini et al. [101], who adapt the ap-
proach to the case where histograms of popular locations are to be k-anonymized, rather
than the complete trajectories. The authors then use a normalized information loss met-
ric that is suitable for the probability distributions they target, and run a legacy cluster-
ing algorithm based on that metric. Evaluations with real-world datasets42 show that re-
identfication is impaired by k-anonymity with k > 10, however that comes at a substantial
information loss above 65%.
3.3.5 Generalized k-anonymity with spatial uncertainty
Abul et al. [4] propose a generalization to the k-anonymity criterion, by assuming that pub-
lished trajectories must be indistinguishable within an uncertainty threshold δ. In other
words, the strong indistinguishability requirement of k-anonymity that each trajectory
must be identical to at least k − 1 others (see Definition 1 in Section 3.1.2) is relaxed, al-
lowing a spatial distance up to δ among each point of an anonymized trajectory and the
concurrent ones of the k − 1 other trajectories. The intuition is that uncertainty among
points within a geographical distance δ still provides sufficient protection, while it requires
less distortion. The generalized criterion is named (k, δ)-anonymity, and its concept is il-
lustrated in Figure 15. This criterion offers inherently reduced privacy guarantees with
respect to pure k-anonymity; in fact, the two criteria match only when δ = 0, i.e., perfect
spatial identity of the anonymized trajectories is enforced, as shown by Trujillo-Rasua and
Domingo-Ferrer [130].
In the original work by Abul et al. [4], an algorithm named Never Walk Alone (NWA) is
proposed to implement (k, δ)-anonymity in uniformly sampled trajectory micro-data while
42The authors use three different datasets: the two-week CDR of 50,000 Orange customers in Ivory Coast re-
leased within the context of the D4D Challenge [20], the Web browsing history of 472 users from the Web History
Repository [71], and 154 users with an average of 15.4 weeks of data each from the GeoLife experiment [147].
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minimizing distortion. NWA is organized in three phases. In the first phase, trajectories
are trimmed so that they start and end at a limited set of time instants, and are then di-
vided into groups with identical time spans. In the second phase, trajectories in a same
group are separated into clusters of cardinality k based on Euclidean distance, and pos-
sibly suppressed if the operation cannot be performed while keeping distances below an
adjustable threshold. In the third and final phase, NWA performs, for each time instant
and each cluster, a minimum translation of spatial points of all trajectories, so that they are
within a distance δ/2 from their arithmetic mean, as exemplified in Figure 15. It is appar-
ent that NWA performs a partial microaggregation, and can be classified along solutions in
Section 3.3.4 when δ = 0.
Experiments with both real-world and synthetic trajectory datasets43 show that NWA at-
tains (k, δ)-anonymity by inducing spatial displacements from several kilometers to several
tens of kilometers, as k grows from 2 to 100, and δ increases from a few hundreds to several
thousand meters.
NWA only operates on trajectories with identical, periodic sampling. To overcome this im-
portant limitation, Abul et al. [5] also propose an improved method that can achieve (k, δ)-
anonymity with proper spatiotemporal trajectories, named Wait For Me (W4M). W4M
largely builds on NWA, but instead of relying on Euclidean distance it uses pairwsise tra-
jectory distance measures that account for different temporal samplings of the input tra-
jectories. The considered metrics are: the Edit Distance on Real sequences (EDR) [32], which
targets quality preservation but has complexity O(pq), where p and q are the number of
points in the two input trajectories; and the linear spatio-temporal distance (LSTD), which
is designed for efficiency, having linear complexityO(p+q). Adopting EDR and LSTD also
has the advantage that the first phase of NWA can be skipped, and all trajectories can be
processed at once in the clustering phase. Tests with heterogeneous datasets44 prove that
W4M achieves substantially lower distortion of spatiotemporal range queries [129] than
NWA, and induces spatial and temporal translations in the order of several kilometers and
hours, respectively. Also, the approach suppresses 5% of points and creates 5% new points
to attain k = 2; these figures grow up to 20% when k > 30.
Further extensions to NWA and W4M are proposed by Kopanaki et al. [82], who intro-
duce a suite of algorithms under the denomination of Who-Cares-about-Others’-Privacy
(WCOP). The variants of WCOP allow accounting for (i) personalized values of k and δ
that vary for each trajectory, (ii) a temporal segmentation of the trajectories such that each
time segment of the dataset can be anonymized in isolation, and (iii) bounded distortion of
the output trajectories.
3.3.6 Indistinguishability beyond k-anonymity: l-diversity and t-closeness
All anonymization solutions presented above implement indistinguishability at the record
level, hence are suitable countermeasures in presence of record linkage attacks. However,
they do not address the indistinguishability of attributes, leaving the door open to the at-
tribute linkage (or homogeneity) attacks discussed in Section 2.9 and Section 2.1.1. This
holds for both cases where sensitive attributes are separated from or embedded in the
43Real-life trajectory micro-data consists of 273 trajectories of trucks [52]. The second one has been generated
using Brinkhoff’s network-based synthetic generator of moving objects [24], and contains 100,000 trajectories
during one day in the city of Oldenburg, Germany.
44The authors employ a real-world dataset of 45,000 GPS trajectories of cars in Milan, Italy, collected during one
week by the GeoPKDD project [60], and synthetic data generated with Brinkhoff’s network-based simulator of
moving objects [24] for 100,000 trajectories over one day in Oldenburg, Germany.
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trajectory data, as per the discussion in Section 2.1.1. As an example, let us consider the
case where the adversary is interested in finding some sensitive location embedded in the
trajectory of the target user: by accessing a k-anonymized database with a few known spa-
tiotemporal samples, the attacker would retrieve k movement patterns; if, however, they
all include the position of a gentlemen club, a privacy breach occurs.
In fact, it is well known that k-anonymity is not a sufficient criterion in the case of attribute
linkage, which asks instead for more complex privacy definitions. Specifically, popular
criteria designed to counter attribute linkage attacks are l-diversity [90] and t-closeness [85].
The former assumes that a precise set of attributes (either separated from or embedded in
the trajectory data, as per the discussion in Section 2.1.1) is identified as sensitive: then,
any trajectory must be indistinguishable from a set of others whose sensitive attributes are
sufficiently different from those of the original trajectory. Formally:
Definition 3. LetD be a database of trajectory micro-data, which includes a set of sensitive
attributes; also, let LBQID be the location-based quasi-identifier associated with D, and
D[LBQID] the set of records returned by a query for LBQID on D. Then, D is said to sat-
isfy l-diversity if and only if the records in D[LBQID] contain at least l “well-represented”
values for the sensitive attributes. Multiple notions of the concept of “well-represented”
are possible, the simplest one being that at least l distinct values for the sensitive fields be
present in D[LBQID].
A step further, t-closeness imposes a statistical constraint on the sensitive attributes, rather
than the numerical one defined by l-diversity. The reason is that in practical cases the se-
mantics of the attribute values are critical: for instance, a query returning a set of records
with l different but correlated attribute values (e.g., l variants of the same rare illness) sat-
isfy l-diversity but still reveals sensitive information about the target user (e.g., the fact that
she suffers from the rare illness). To avoid these situations, t-closeness ensures that there
is no substantial statistical difference between the attribute values in every set of indistin-
guishable users and those in the whole user population. Formally:
Definition 4. LetD be a database of trajectory micro-data, which includes a set of sensitive
attributes; also, let LBQID be the location-based quasi-identifier associated with D, and
D[LBQID] the set of records returned by a query for LBQID on D. Then, D is said to
satisfy t-closeness if and only if the records inD[LBQID] contain sensitive attributes whose
distribution has a distance lower than t to the distribution of the attributes in the whole D.
While the problem has long been addressed in the context of LBS, for instance in the
early study by Riboni et al. [109], the only works to date that tackles the anonymization
of trajectory micro-data in a way to achieve both l-diversity and t-closeness are those by
Tu et al. [132, 131]. The authors focus on semantic attacks where the sensitive information
is embedded in the spatiotemporal points, and corresponds to the points of interest (PoI)
present in a target geographical region. Therefore, they propose an algorithm that builds
on GLOVE by Gramaglia and Fiore [66]; as such, it leverages both generalization and
suppression of samples, however these operations are augmented to ensure that each gen-
eralized sample fulfills the t− closeness (and, implicitly, l-diversity) criterion. Specifically,
the difference between the PoI distributions within each sample and in the whole database,
measured in terms of Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence, must be below a threshold t. The
performance evaluation with measurement data45 shows that the proposed solution can
45Two datasets are used for the evaluation. The first dataset is from a Chinese cellular network in Shanghai, and
covers one week of data generated by 5,9 million users with an average number of 261 points each. The second
dataset is from 15,500 users of a mobile application in Shanghai, and features a mean of 496 points per user.
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reduce KL divergence by a factor three while sacrificing an additional 30% of the spatial
and temporal resolution over the baseline k-anonymity granted by GLOVE.
3.4 Solutions providing uninformativeness
The second important privacy principle explored in the literature is that of uninformative-
ness. This principle aims to cope with probabilistic attacks and has received substantial
attention in recent times. As anticipated in Section 3.1.3, the de-facto standard criterion
to implement uniformativeness is differential privacy, a popular privacy criterion first in-
troduced by Dwork et al. [48] for PPDM. Implementing differential privacy is especially
elegant and simple in presence of algorithms that execute numeric or categorical queries.
In the former case, the output is a vector of scalars, and differential privacy is obtained by
the Laplacian mechanism, which adds Laplacian noise to such an output as first proposed by
Dwork et al. [48]. In the second case, the output is a probability distribution over a discrete,
finite set of outcomes, and differential privacy is obtained by randomizing the probabil-
ity according to an exponential mechanism, as first explained by McSherry and Talwar [93].
In both situations above, the level of noise or randomization is calibrated according to ,
as well as to the maximum difference among all possible outputs when a single record
is removed. In addition, under such query models, differentially private algorithms en-
joy composition properties that describe how multiple queries consume the budget ; this
allows calibrating noise to the type and frequency of queries permitted on the database.
In the context of trajectory data, differential privacy has been successfully used to guar-
antee location privacy, i.e., warranting that queries on single spatiotemporal points satisfy
the uninformativeness principle. Criteria like geo-indisitinguishability, first introduced by
Andre´s et al. [10], or based on the location-privacy metrics proposed by Shokri et al. [120]
adapt differential privacy to the specific case of location data. A number of works have im-
plemented and possibly enhanced the criteria above, including those by Assam et al. [11],
Chatzikokolakis et al. [29], Bordenabe et al. [23], Xiao and Xiong [139], or Ngo and Kim [104].
However, as explained in Section 1.3, solutions that anonymize queries on instantaneous
locations are relevant for LBS, but not for trajectory PPDP.
Closer to our context of data publishing, a fairly large body of works have concentrated
on PPDP of aggregate statistics from trajectory micro-data. A commonly studied class of
aggregates is that of spatial densities, especially in the form of quadtrees, i.e., hierarchical
spatial structures that allow for efficient querying: solutions such as those proposed by
Cormode et al. [38], Qardaji et al. [107], Li et al. [84] or by Zhang et al. [146] allow generat-
ing differentially private density databases from the actual trajectories, which can then be
publicly released and safely queried. Extensions, such as those by Acs and Castelluccia [6]
or Alaggan et al. [9], consider spatiotemporal densities from trajectory micro-data, devel-
oping solutions that account for the temporal dimension of the aggregate statistics in addi-
tion to the spatial one. Other classes of trajectory data aggregates that can be transformed
to meet differential privacy guarantees include weighted spatial graphs that describe tran-
sit counts between locations, such as those considered by Brunet et al. [25], or histograms,
such as those assumed by Hay et al. [69]. Further investigations, e.g., by Kellaris et al. [78]
or Cao et al. [26], adapt the techniques above to the case of streaming data, where privacy-
preserving spatial density information needs to be continuously published. Nevertheless,
none of these works applies to PPDP of trajectory micro-data, which is the focus of our re-
view; indeed, they do not allow releasing spatiotemporal trajectories, but only their density
or count statistics.
When applied to our target milieu, i.e., publishing actual trajectory data, differential pri-
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vacy recommends that the output of an algorithm run on the released database is not af-
fected by any single original trajectory beyond the privacy budget . Unfortunately, due
the very high dimensionality of each trajectory, there is no current method to achieve such
a goal by directly adding noise to the trajectory micro-data with existing mechanisms such
as Laplacian or exponential. Therefore, two alternative approaches have been explored: (i)
considering softened notions of differential privacy; or, (ii) generating synthetic trajectories
that mimic the properties of true individual user movements yet ensure that the differential
privacy criterion is fully met.
Below, we review solutions that adopt the first strategy in Section 3.4.1, and present
works that instead take the second approach in Section 3.4.2. We also present a couple
of works that adopt other criteria than differential privacy to realize uninformativeness, in
Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4.
3.4.1 (, δ)-differentially private trajectory micro-data
A weaker notion of differential privacy that has been successfully adopted for the PPDP of
trajectories is (, δ)-differential privacy. This is a relaxation of the basic notion of differential
privacy provided in Section 3.1.3 (which we recall to be also referred to as -differential pri-
vacy), where privacy breaches are allowed to occur with a (small) probability δ. Formally:
Definition 5. A randomized algorithm A offers (, δ)-differential privacy if for all datasets
D′ and D′′ differing in one element (|D′ − D′′| = 1), and all subsets S of the output of A,
then Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] ≤ e × Pr[A(D′′) ∈ S] + δ.
Shao et al. [117] propose techniques that achieve (, δ)-differential privacy by combining
trajectory sampling and interpolation, either in this order (a-priori) or in the reverse one
(a-posteriori). The sampling phase realizes a (0, δ) form of differential privacy, by pre-
serving one original point in every 1/δ: these points are publicly disclosed, and represent
the privacy breach. The interpolation (a classic cubic Be´zier) instead completes the gaps
in between the retained points; by the composition properties of differential privacy, such
a deterministic operation preserves the privacy properties of the sampling. Then, under
the important assumption that the initial and final points of each trajectory are publicly
known and their disclosure does not represent a privacy breach, both strategies attain (0, δ)-
differential privacy. Experiments46 show that the a-posteriori method tends to have better
results in terms of average error when querying the privacy-preserving database.
3.4.2 Differentially private synthetic trajectory micro-data
Proper differential privacy can be guaranteed by a different process where (i) some rep-
resentation of the original trajectory micro-data is randomized so as to meet differential
privacy requirements, and (ii) synthetic trajectories are derived from such representations.
Then, databases of these synthetic trajectories can be distributed under provable privacy
guarantees.
Representing trajectory micro-data as trees. The first work to adopt the methodology
above is that by Chen et al. [34]. They model the original database as a prefix tree, i.e., a hier-
archical structure where trajectories are grouped based on matching location subsequences
whose length grows with tree depth47. A privacy-preserving version of the prefix tree is
46The study uses one-hour GPS data of ships in the Singapore Straits.
47Although we present it in the context of trajectory micro-data, the approach is general, and can operate on
any type of sequential data.
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Figure 16: Toy example of the approach by Chen et al. [34] to generate differentially pri-
vate synthetic trajectories. (a) Original spatial trajectory database. (b) Prefix tree structure
summarizing the original database. (c) Differentially private prefix tree with height 2, un-
der two levels of generalization: high-level generalized locations L(1, 2) and L(3, 4), and
the low-level full-granularity locations L1, L2, L3, L4. Two iterations i and ii are needed
to attain the desired tree height of 2. Within each iteration, nodes for all possible higher-
level generalizations – L(1, 2) and L(3, 4) in the example – are created from each leaf of
the previous iteration. Such nodes are then expanded to lower-level full-granularity nodes
only if their Laplacian noisy count is above a threshold (set to 3 here). The model can ac-
commodate more than two levels of generalization, which creates additional layers within
each iteration i and ii, one for each generalization level. (d) Differentially private prefix
tree upon pruning of all nodes for generalized locations, and with noisy counts made con-
sistent among parent and child nodes. (e) Example of the synthetic trajectories extracted
from the final prefix tree structure.
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Figure 17: Examples of n-grams used as trajectory representation by Chen et al. [33], for the
database of trajectory micro-data in Figure 16. Columns are the sequence (Gram), number
of occurrences (O), and probability (P). (a) 1-grams. (b) 2-grams.
then obtained by considering multiple levels of spatial generalization based on a prede-
termined location taxonomy, and iterating on the following operations at each prefix tree
layer. First, nodes are created for all locations at the highest level of generalization, as chil-
dren of each leaf from the previous iteration; second, Laplacian noise is added to the count
of trajectories associated to each generalized node at the current prefix tree layer; third,
nodes with a noisy count below a tunable threshold are not expanded further, while nodes
with noisy counts above threshold generate children nodes for all locations at the follow-
ing level of generalization. The process is repeated from the second step above. Iterations
conclude once a user-defiend tree height is reached, with Laplacian noises set so that the
total privacy budget  is equally divided across all tree levels and nodes within each level.
An example is provided in Figure 16, plots (a)-(c).
Then, differentially private synthetic trajectories can be derived from the sanitized prefix
tree. To this end, the tree is pruned so that only nodes at the lowest level of generalization
(i.e., retaining the maximum spatial granularity) are preserved. Then, the noisy counts as-
sociated to such nodes are made consistent across levels, ensuring that the count of each
node is not less than the sum of counts of its children nodes. Finally, the synthetic trajecto-
ries are generated by visiting the resulting prefix tree. An example is provided in Figure 16,
plots (d)-(e).
We remark that the solution is introduced for trajectories that are defined on a discrete
space, but it can be extended to include discrete time information as well. Tests in a real-
world case study48 show that the private synthetic trajectories can be mined to count pas-
sengers at stations, as well as to identify frequent sequential patterns of public transport
usage, with a relatively low error.
Chen et al. [33] propose a variant to the strategy above, where the main difference is that
the prefix tree is replaced by an n-gram representation. This probabilistic model describes
trajectories as transition probabilities based on a past history of (n− 1) locations, i.e., corre-
spond to a Markovian model of order (n− 1). Figure 17 illustrates the concept of n-grams.
The rest of the procedure is equivalent, by deriving a private prefix tree from the n-grams
rather than from the original trajectories, and skipping intermediate generalization. Specif-
ically, properly calibrated Laplacian noise is added to the counts of all 1-grams, expanding
them to 2-grams only if their noisy count is above a threshold. Then, the procedure is re-
peated for always longer n-grams, descending into the prefix tree structure. The result is
differentially private variable-length n-grams, which can then be publicly released, or used
to generate synthetic trajectories. Experiments with real-life datasets49 show that also in
48The authors employ information collected by the Socie´te´ de Transport de Montre´al (STM) about the transit
history of passengers in the underground and bus networks of Montreal, Canada. The data contains over 1.5 mil-
lion trajectories, with an average of around 5 locations each, out of a universe of 90 and 121 maximum locations,
respectively.
49The authors use the same STM dataset described in footnote 48, as well as 989,000 sequences of URL categories
browsed by users on msnbc.com [44] with a mean length of 5.7 categories in a total set of 17.
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this case count queries and frequent pattern mining return reliable results when run on the
synthetic data.
Various refinements of the techniques above are proposed, e.g., by Bonomi and Li [22]
and Qardaji et al. [107]. Note however, that these works aim at developing differentially
private tree synopses of trajectory databases, but do not leverage them for the generation
of synthetic trajectory micro-data. Instead, Zhang et al. [146] propose to extend PrivTree – a
method they originally introduced for privacy-preserving release of spatial density data –
to the case of synthetic sequential data generation. They adopt a prediction suffix tree model
of trajectory micro-data that is similar in spirit to the prefix tree considered by Chen et
al. [34]; however, adapting PrivTree to work on prediction suffix trees allows the authors
to remove two limitations of previous techniques. First, it automatically adapts the tree
height to the data, which is thus not a fixed parameter anymore; second, the decision of
expanding a tree node is not based on a simple count, but adopts a more advanced strategy
that also accounts for the entropy of the eventual children nodes. A comparative evaluation
against the solution proposed by Chen et al. [33] proves that synthetic trajectories generated
by PrivTree from real-life sequential data50 allow for a 10% or higher improvement in two
tasks, i.e., (i) top-k frequent string mining, and (ii) approximate the distribution of sequence
lengths.
He et al. [70] demonstrate that the approaches above work well with coarse trajectories
defined on small location domains, but fail to scale to realistic database where fine-grained
trajectories unfold over moderately large geographical span. The reason is that the repre-
sentations used by Chen et al. [33] grow in size as a power law of the number of discrete
locations, with an exponent equal to the depth of the prefix tree. Therefore, the authors pro-
pose to generate multiple prefix trees, each referring to a different spatial resolution; each
transition in a trajectory contributes to one specific tree, based on the travelled distance
(i.e., low-resolution trees for long distances, and high-resolution trees for short distances).
This results in multiple trees with a very small branching factor each, and in a significant
reduction of the overall number of counts maintained. Then, the usual procedure of adding
Laplace noise to counts, pruning the prefix trees, and extracting the synthetic trajectories is
followed. In this last step, the authors also adopt an original sampling technique that allow
preserving the correct directionality in the output trajectories.
The solution, named Differentially Private Trajectories (DPT), is evaluated with both real
and synthetic datasets51 that are queried for distributions of diameters and trips, and for
frequent sequential patterns. Results show that DPT largely outperforms the n-grams-
based approach by Chen et al. [33] in the considered case studies.
Representing trajectory micro-data as probability distributions. A quite different strat-
egy from those above is proposed by Mir et al. [95]. They introduce DP-WHERE, a differ-
entially private synthetic trajectory generator that does not rely on a tree model of the orig-
inal trajectory micro-data. Instead, DP-WHERE performs the following steps: (i) derives a
number of distributions that describe different statistical features of the movements in the
original trajectory database, such as the spatial distribution of home and work locations,
or the number of spatiotemporal points in a trajectory; (ii) adds Laplacian noise to such
distributions; (iii) extracts realizations from the noisy distributions to generate synthetic
50The study uses 80,362 learners’ sequences of activities (among 8 possible states) on a MOOC platform, as well
as 989,818 sequences of URL categories browsed by visitors at msnbc.com during a 24-hour period.
51Experiments are run on over 4 million GPS trajectories of 8,600 cabs in Beijing, China, during May 2009. Space
is discretized into over 138,000 100× 100-m2 cells, leading to an average of 20 points per trajectory. Further tests
employ Brinkhoff’s network-based generator for moving objects [24] The data consists of 15 million trajectories
of 50,000 synthetic individuals in the region of Oldenburg, Germany, with a spatial resolution of 50× 50-m2.
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Figure 18: Block diagram of the operation of the DP-WHERE solution by Mir et al. [95].
DP-WHERE creates differentially private noisy version of distributions of home and work
locations, commute distances (based on the home location), points per day, time at which
points are recorded, and locations at which points are recorded (on a hourly basis). Then,
values are drawn from such distributions, and combined so as to associate home and work
locations to each synthetic user, and generate spatiotemporal points that are then associated
with a user.
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Figure 19: Block diagram of the operation of the DP-Star solution by Gursoy et al. [68]. The
input trajectory micro-data is downsampled so as to only retain utility-preserving move-
ment information. Then, multiple representations are extracted from the downsampled
trajectories. The representations are made differentially private my means of Laplacian
and median mechanisms. Finally, privacy-preserving synthetic trajectories are generated
from the noisy representations.
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trajectories. A more detailed view of the considered distributions and their combination is
in Figure 18. The synthetic movement data52 produced by DP-WHERE is proven to pre-
serve population density distributions over time, as well as daily ranges of commutes in
the reference area.
Roy et al. [113] follow a similar approach in their proposed Sanitization Model. First, they
remove outlying records from the original dataset by applying the statistical interquartile
range rule to all attributes. Second, they run legacy independence and homogeneity tests
on attributes, and group attributes with high associativity in non-disjoint sets. Third, they
derive synthetic distributions for each attribute group, and add Laplacian noise to them
based on the available privacy budget. Fourth, synthetic records are generated by drawing
samples from these distributions and aggregating them. An interesting aspect of the work
is the strategy it adopts to assess the quality of the synthetic trajectory micro-data obtained
via the Sanitization Model. The authors consider a database published during a data visu-
alization contest53, and replicate the competition submissions using both the original and
differentially private trajectories. They find that the vast majority of the results are nearly
identical, although it should be noted that the reference data is limited to trajectories where
only the start and end locations and times are known.
The most recent proposal in probability-distribution-based approaches is DP-Star by Gur-
soy et al. [68], whose operation is summarized in Figure 19. DP-Star first runs a prepro-
cessing phase, during which raw trajectories are downsampled via Minimum Description
Length (MDL), and reduced minimum sequences of representative points; also during pre-
processing, the privacy budget  is automatically split among the different core components
by solving an optimization problem. The, DP-Star generates discretized representations
of: (i) space, as a non-uniform grid whose cell granularity is adapted to the geographi-
cal density of trajectory points; (ii) trips between start and end locations, as a probability
distribution; (iii) internal trip structures, as a Markovian model of transition probability
among locations; (iv) route lengths, as the median distance covered by trajectories starting
at each location. Representations in (i)–(iii) are perturbed with Laplacian noise, while the
noisy median route lengths are obtained with the median mechanism proposed by Cormode
et al. [38].
Differentially private synthetic trajectory micro-data is then extracted by combining the
representations above, by selecting start and end grid cells, determining a route length
based on the start cell, defining a sequence of cells via the Markovian model, and finally
converting cells to actual points. We remark that DP-Star generates spatial trajectories that
do not include temporal information, unlike, e.g., DP-WHERE. Evaluations with substan-
tial real-world data54 shows that DP-Star retains significantly higher utility than the n-
gram-based solution by Chen et al. [33] and DPT by He et al. [70], under several types of
queries on trajectory micro-data.
52Experiments are carried out on 10,000 synthetic users generated from 1-billion CDR of 250,000 subscribers in
the region of New York, NJ, USA, during three months in 2011. The spatial resolution of the synthetic data is of 7
miles, i.e., around 11 km.
53The study leverages data provided by the Hubway bike sharing initiation and the Metropolitan Area Planning
Council (MAPC) of Boston within their Hubway Data Visualization Challenge. The database consists of historical
data about over one million bike trips in the grater Boston area. For each trip, the data include the start and end
spatiotemporal points, as well as non-positioning information about the gender and subscription type of the rider.
54Three different datasets are considered: 14,650 GPS trajectories from the GeoLife project [147], with an average
of over 900 points each; 30,000 taxi traces collected in Porto, Portugal, with 43 points each on average; 50,000
synthetic trajectories created using Brinkhoff’s generator [24].
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Figure 20: Descriptive overview of the technique adopted to implement plausible deniabil-
ity in synthetic trajectory micro-data. Figure from Bindschaedler and Shokri [18].
3.4.3 Plausible deniability
Bindschaedler and Shokri [18] propose an alternative definition of privacy for synthetic
trajectories that also aims at realizing the uninformativeness principle. Their criterion is
based on plausible deniability: only a subset of seed original trajectories is leveraged to gen-
erate the synthetic output trajectory micro-data, and the inclusion of a particular real tra-
jectory among the seeds must be plausibly deniable. Such a condition is achieved by re-
quiring that each synthetic trajectory in the released database could have been generated
by a sufficiently large number of users in the original database, including those that were
not selected as seeds. Formally:
Definition 6. A synthetic trajectory f generated from a seed trajectory s ∈ S ⊂ D satisfies
(k, δ)-plausible deniability if there are at least k ≥ 1 alternative trajectories a ∈ D such that
the similarity σ of f and s is not much higher than the same similarity measured between
f and any a, or |σ(s, f)− σ(a, f)| ≤ δ.
In the definition above, k denotes the number of trajectories in the original database that
is large enough to ensure that the deniability of the presence of s in the released data is
actually plausible. Such original trajectories must yield a similarity with the synthetic tra-
jectory, measured by a metric σ, within a threshold δ from that between the synthetic and
seed trajectories.
In order to ensure plausibly deniability of synthetic trajectory micro-data, the authors
adopt a strategy of: (i) transforming each seed input trajectory into a semantic space, and
then probabilistically transform it back to the original geographic space; (ii) verifying if the
proposed re-transformed trace satisfies plausible deniability when confronted to the origi-
nal database, and only adding it to the output database if the answer is positive. Figure 20
offers an overview of the proposed scheme.
Phase (i) allows generating a synthetic copy of an original trajectory so that spatiotem-
poral features are preserved, and its main challenge is defining the transformation. To
this end, the authors proceed as follows. First, each seed input trajectory is summarized
into a mobility model that captures statistical information on the visiting probability to ev-
ery location and the transition probabilities among such locations. A pairwise semantic
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY ()
50
similarity of mobility models is then computed as their maximum geographical closeness
under all possible mappings of visited locations: the rationale is that two similar trajec-
tories follow equivalent spatiotemporal patterns (e.g., the same home→ work→ other→
home repeated sequences) at different locations (i.e., the exact home, work and other loca-
tions are distinct for the two users, and possibly far apart), hence a suitable mapping of
locations (e.g., considering the two home locations to be the same, and similarly for work
and other) can reveal their resemblance. Finally, all similarity information is aggregated in
a location semantic graph: the nodes are the locations, and edge weights are the average
semantic similarity between two locations over all pairs of mobility models. Intuitively,
high weights characterize pairs of locations that are visited in similar ways by many users
in the original database. The scheme thus performs a clustering on the graph, so that se-
mantically similar (but geographically distinct) locations are grouped together in a same
class.
The transformation in (i) above consists in replacing locations in the original seed trajec-
tory with their classes, which thus represent the semantic space. The re-transformation
occurs according to an aggregate mobility model (i.e., an average of all individual mobil-
ity models), which is run across the semantic space under the constraint that its locations
are a subset of the locations of the target semantic trace. The constraint ensures that each
synthetic trajectory shares the same semantic trace with its original version.
The probabilistic nature of the aggregate mobility model allows generating multiple syn-
thetic trajectories for a same original seed user, which is leveraged in phase (ii) of the so-
lution. Once one synthetic trajectory is generated, it undergoes a privacy test based on
plausible deniability: specifically, it is verified that it does not leak more information about
the real mobility of the user than it does for other original trajectories in the input database.
If the test fails, then a different synthetic trajectory is generated for the user, and the process
is iterated. In a follow-up work, Bindschaedler et al. [19] show that a randomized form of
the solution above achieves in fact (, δ)-differential privacy, under a rigid set of  and δ
values.
Experiments with measurement data55 show that the synthetic trajectory micro-data re-
tains, under k = 1, significant utility in terms of visit frequency distributions, top-n location
coverage, user time allocation, spatiotemporal and semantic mobility features.
3.4.4 kτ,-anonymity
Gramaglia et al. [65] introduce kτ,-anonymity, a privacy criterion that stems from the
original k-anonymity but has fundamentally different semantics. The idea behind kτ,-
anonymity is ensuring that any subset of spatiotemporal points known to the adversary
matches k trajectories, and that such k trajectories are sufficiently diverse from each other
in the rest of their points. Formally:
Definition 7. Let D be a database of trajectory micro-data and LBQID the location-based
quasi-identifier associated with it comprising τ spatiotemporal points. Also, letD[LBQID]
be the set of records returned by a query for LBQID on D. Then, D is said to satisfy
kτ,-anonymity if and only if the records in D[LBQID] are at least k, and only share an
additional set of  points other than the τ in the LBQID.
55The authors generate synthetic trajectories from the interpolated GPS data of 30 seed users participating in
the Nokia Lausanne Data Collection Campaign [80]. The data is preprocessed so that all trajectories have a fixed
sampling interval of 20 minutes, and a duration of one day; also, rarely visited locations are clustered together, so
that the total number of locations is reduced by 60%. A different day of mobility of the same 30 users is leveraged
as the alternative database during the test phase that ensures plausible deniability.
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Figure 21: Illustrative example of kτ,-anonymity of user i, for k = 2, using the movements
of five other subscribers a, b, c, d, e. An adversary knowing a sub-trajectory of i during
any time interval of duration τ always finds at least one (i.e., k − 1) other user with a
movement pattern that is identical to that of i during that interval, but different elsewhere.
With this knowledge, the adversary cannot tell apart i from the other subscriber, and thus
cannot attribute full trajectories to one user or the other. As this holds no matter where the
knowledge interval is shifted to, the attacker can never retrieve the complete movement
patterns of i: this achieves the uninformativeness principle. Still, the adversary can increase
its knowledge in some cases. Let us consider the interval τ indicated in the figure: the
trajectories of i, d and e are identical for some time after τ , which allows associating to i the
movements during : the attacker learns one additional spatiotemporal point of i. Figure
from Gramaglia et al. [65].
According to the definition above, given a subset of any τ points in a target trajectory,
the subset is k-anonymous, i.e., is indistinguishable from points in k − 1 other trajectories.
However, apart from the τ points, the target trajectory only shares a small number of addi-
tional  points with the k−1 trajectories used to anonymize the subset under consideration.
The correct implementation of kτ,-anonymity grants that the attacker cannot distinguish
among k separated alternative trajectories that stem from his known points, and cannot
infer substantial additional positioning information about his target user by accessing the
database. Hence, kτ,-anonymity realizes the uninformativeness principle. As an inter-
esting remark, when τ maps to the whole target trajectory, kτ,-anonymity reduces to the
original k-anonymity; therefore, solutions providing the former can be naively reduced to
offer the latter privacy criterion.
The solution proposed by Gramaglia et al. [65], named kte-hide, satisfies the privacy
criterion under the assumption that the points of the LBQID are adjacent in time; in this
case, τ and  can be mapped to time intervals rather than numbers of points. The algorithm
then alternates different and partially overlapping anonymity sets over subsequent inter-
vals of duration τ+, realizing the structure illustrated in the toy example of Figure 21. The
performance evaluation of kte-hide is based on real-world datasets56, and shows that the
method is capable of attaining 2τ,-anonymity under seamless adversary knowledge rang-
ing between 10 minutes and 4 hours, and  = τ . The solution retains a median accuracy of
the anonymized trajectory data of 1-2 km in space and less than 1 hour in time.
56The authors use nationwide and citywide CDR-based trajectories released in the context of the D4D Chal-
lenge [20], as well as CDR data collected by the University of Minnesota [145]. The resulting datasets follow
30,000–300,000 users for 1 day to 2 weeks in Abidjan, Dakar, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Shenzhen.
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4 Discussion and perspectives
Based on the comprehensive survey of attacks against released databases of trajectory
micro-data, and of countermeasures against such threats, our main takeaway message is
that PPDP of trajectories is still a largely open problem. There is substantial space for
improvement at all levels, and we outline below some promising directions for future re-
search.
4.1 Realistic and credible risk assessments
It is important that the privacy risks associated with the publication of trajectory micro-
data are assessed in practical settings. The vast majority of the works in the literature high-
light very high re-identification (i.e., successful record linkage) rates, announcing dramatic
hazard for the privacy of the monitored individuals. However, these results have to be in-
terpreted with a grain of salt. Many assume that the adversary knows some spatiotemporal
points of its target user, which happen to be exactly in the target database (i.e., a spatiotem-
poral subset format of the side information, according to our classification): this is very
unlikely to happen in real life, as the adversary would have to anticipate when the user’s
location will be sampled by the positioning system. Similarly, it is simplistic to assume that
the adversary is aware of its target’s locations sampled with similar temporal frequency
and spatial accuracy than those in the target dataset; or, equivalently, it is naive to expect
that an attacker can build mobility profiles that are as detailed as those it can infer from the
target trajectory micro-data. Indeed, there is a legitimate question on whether an attacker
having such a substantial knowledge would be actually interested in making a large effort
to retrieve “more of the same” data.
Note that we are not downplaying the privacy issues in trajectory micro-data– which we
believe are many and extremely relevant. However, we advocate for more realistic risk
assessments that are representative of the actual conditions an attacker could operate in.
Practical attacks require identifying and retrieving useful side information, and performing
a reliable match with the target data; moreover, in most cases the attacker has to deal with
uncertainty about the presence of its target user in the target database, as well as about
an eventual match (since it does not possess any ground truth information guaranteeing
that the match is correct). In absence of these practical considerations, studies may lead to
overpessimistic claims on privacy risks, which are instead mitigated when attacks are run
in the wild.
The recent work by Wang et al. [138], who show that figures on attack success rates in
the literature are largely exaggerated when considering closer-to-reality settings, is a first
evidence in this sense. However, it is not a definitive one, as the authors still retain many
assumptions that simplify the attacker’s work. More realistic and credible assessments of
the actual risks associated with record linkage of trajectory micro-data are required.
4.2 Risks beyond record linkage
Record linkage absorbs almost the whole literature on attacks against trajectory micro-data,
as it is well illustrated in Table 1. However, these are, at least in theory, the simplest form
of menace against trajectory databases. Therefore, our considerations above on risk assess-
ment are exacerbated in the case of attacks that are more complex than record linkage.
The privacy risks of, e.g., attribute linkage (just to consider the next level of threat) are
basically unexplored. Homogeneity, i.e., the weakness that paves the way for attribure
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY ()
53
linkage, is a clearly understood concept, for which toy examples are easily constructed,
and for which practical cases have been demonstrated in the context of relational databases.
However, whether homogeneity actually exists, and, if so, to which level, remains a fully
open question when it comes to the sensitive attributes one could link to trajectory micro-
data. To date, we can only imagine that the risk may exist, but we do not even have a rough
picture of its practical viability. The situation is similar for probabilistic attacks. Therefore,
and even more than in the case of record linkage, realistic risk assessments of attribute
linkage or probabilistic attacks represent an opportunity for future investigation.
4.3 Silver bullet anonymization
Anonymizing trajectory micro-data is extremely complex, and this is apparent from the
number of solutions proposed over the past few years. We have understood that mitigation
techniques simply do not work: reducing the spatial or temporal resolution of the data
does not help, and also shortened or intertwined trajectories retain re-identifiability risks.
Unfortunately, also more complex approaches are far from perfect.
On one hand, techniques that grant k-anonymity are today fairly mature, preserve indi-
vidual trajectories, and can retain a decent level of precision in the anonymized data (see
Table 3). However, they typically scale poorly with k. More importantly, they only of-
fer a protection against record linkage, and leave the data prone to more complex attacks,
disregarding for the moment the question if these are actually feasible or not (see above).
On the other hand, differential privacy and its extensions for location data are very hard to
apply to trajectory micro-data. As of today, all solutions implementing such privacy prin-
ciple construct some model from the original data, apply noise so as to make the model
differentially private, and then generate synthetic trajectories from the noisy model. It is
clear that the anonymized dataset only retain global properties, and prevents analyses that
require following actual individuals. Moreover, the global properties that can be explored
through data mining are the same that are preserved by the noisy model: i.e., there is no
guarnatee that features that are lost during the modelling phase will be reflected in the out-
put database. Again, this poses potential limits to the nature of queries one can safely run
on the anonymized data. Finally, most solutions for differential privacy also do not scale
well, and are only demonstrated with simplistic databases of trajectories that are either
very short, only defined over space, or spanning a small set of total locations.
As a result, the quest for a silver bullet anonymization solution for trajectory micro-data
is still open, and it may pass through new privacy principles that go beyond k-anonymity
or differentialy privacy.
4.4 Reproducible research and comparative evaluations
A striking aspect of most works in the literature on trajectory micro-data anonymization is
that they provide very little in terms of comparison with previous solutions. This is clearly
an issue that hinders our capability of untangling the body of literature and name a clear
winner in the contest for the current state-of-the-art. We identify three main reasons for
such an undesirable situation.
First, there is a lack of reference dataset of trajectory micro-data. Synthetic datasets (e.g.,
those presented in [142, 15, 134] struggle to rise to such a status, due to their artificial na-
ture. Publicly available datasets collected in the real world (e.g., those in the CRAWDAD
repository) are fairly old and limited in size. Some larger real-life databases have been
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released, e.g., as part of challenges by mobile network operators [20], yet they are pro-
tected by non-disclosure agreements that prevent their open distribution. Many works
thus rely on proprietary data that is not made accessible to the research community, again
due to agreements with the data providers, which are typically companies. Such a scenario
makes it hard to develop a reference set of trajectory databases like in other communities,
hence limits the possibility of verifying the performance of different solutions on the same
ground. Overall, we argue that there is a significant need for some large academic initiative
to collect and release such open trajectory micro-data.
Second, the approaches adopted to evaluate different anonymization techniques vary
widly across studies. Works in the literature use a plethora of different quality measures,
error metrics, queries and data mining analyses, which are however very diverse. Re-
searchers have a tendency to always design new metrics (possibly well suited to their pro-
posed solution), making it impossible to confront the performance evaluations carried out
in two different papers. Also in this case, we need a reference set of metrics or tasks for
quality assessment of the anonymized data, to be adopted throughout all studies and al-
lowing a direct comparison of the performance figures. Clearly, such a set shall be large
enough to cover a vast range of data usages, and avoid favouring one solution over the
other.
Third, very few researchers release the source code of their solutions. This is a despicable
but common practice that curbs not only the reproducibility and comparability, but also
the mere verifiability of the results. We argue that, as a community, we should move to
a fully verifiable model where all papers proposing anonymization techniques shall be
accompanied by their source code, possibly written in a commonly agreed language.
Overcoming the three problems above would make comparison straightforward and un-
avoidable, and improve the scientific rigour of the process towards solving the problem of
anonymization of trajectory micro-data.
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